Conferences and Ph.D. Courses

Ph.D. course: Empirical Methods in Industrial Organization and Energy Economics

The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) in Stockholm cordially invites graduate students enrolled in academic institutions in the Nordic countries to the PhD course Empirical Methods in Industrial Organization and Energy Economics. These lectures present quantitative techniques used in empirical work in Industrial Organization and Energy Economics. The course will be given as an intensive course June 14-17, 2010.
 

Lecturer: Professor Frank A. Wolak
Department of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford CA, 94305-6072
wolak@stanford.edu 
www.stanford.edu/~wolak 
Phone: (650)-723-3944 

 
 

Course requirements: These lectures will make extensive use of first-year microeconomic theory, game theory, and econometric theory. Students are expected to read the assigned papers before each lecture.
Course credits: An approved course yields 4 ECTS credits granted by at the Stockholm Doctoral Program in Economics (SDPE).
Course evaluation: Examination is in the form of a take-home assignment. The submission deadline is June 24, 2010. The assignment is to be submitted to par.holmberg@ifn.se.
Venue:

NB!! Change of venue!!

Stockholm School of Economics (SSE)
Sveavägen 65
113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
www.hhs.se

Registration: The number of students is limited, and all who wish to participate must register to elisabeth.gustafsson@ifn.se  by April 15, 2010.
Costs: The course is free of charge, but students must secure their own funding for travel and accommodation. IFN assists in booking accommodation, please contact elisabeth.gustafsson@ifn.se

 

For updated information go to www.ifn.se/minicourse2010_wolak or contact thomas.tangeras@ifn.se, par.holmberg@ifn.se or elisabeth.gustafsson@ifn.se
 

Download an updated course description: pdf  


Course outline: 
 

Date     Room Topic
Monday June 14 10.00-11.30

Room 750 (SSE)

Introduction to Structural Econometric Modeling
    13.00-14.30 Room 750 (SSE) Structural Econometric Modeling of Producer Behavior

Tuesday

June 15 10.00-11.30 Room "Ruben", Saltmätargatan 13-17 (ground floor) Applications of Empirical Models of Producer Behavior in Regulated Industries
    13.00-14.30 Room "Ruben" Models of Imperfect Competition with and without Forward Markets
Wednesday June 16 10.00-11.30 Room "Ruben" Multi-Unit Auction Markets
    13.00-14.30 Room "Ruben" Measuring Unilateral Market Power and Market Performance
 Wednesday  June 16 18.00

"Terrace room"
Holländargatan 32, top floor

Conference Dinner
 Thursday June 17 10.00-11.30 Room "Ruben" Measuring Market Performance
    13.00-14.30 Room "Ruben" Vertical Relations and Market Power in Gasoline and Electricity


 


Readings (copies distributed at the start of the course):

 

1. Introduction to Structural Econometric Modeling — Lecture 1

Reiss, Peter C. and Wolak, Frank A. (2003), “Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization,” Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6A, (edited by James J. Heckman and Edward E. Leamer), 2007, 4277-4415 (draft available at http://www.stanford.edu/~wolak) [First Four Sections of Paper]

Porter, Robert (1983), “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886,” Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2, Autumn), 301-314.


2. Structural Econometric Modeling of Producer Behavior — Lecture 2

Christensen, Laurits and Greene, William H. (1976), “Economies of Scale in U. S. Electric Power Generation,” Journal of Political Economy, 84 (4, August), 655-676.

McElroy, Marjorie (1987), “Additive General Error Models for Production, Cost, and Derived Demand or Share Systems,” Journal of Political Economy, 95(4), 737-757.

Evans, David and Heckman, James (1984), “A Test of Subadditivity of the Cost Function with an Application to the Bell System,” American Economic Review, 74 (4,September), 615-623.


3. Applications of Empirical Models of Producer Behavior in Regulated Industries — Lecture 3

Wolak, F. A. (2007), “Public Utility Pricing,” available on web-site.

Wolak, F.A. (1994), “An Econometric Analysis of the Asymmetric Information Regulator-Utility Interaction,” Annales D’Economie et de Statistique, 34, 12-69. (draft available on web-site).


4. Models of Imperfect Competition with and without Forward Markets — Lecture 4

Vives, X., Oligopoly Pricing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999 (Chapters 1, 4 and 5).

Klemperer, Paul, and Meyer, Margaret A. (1989), “Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty,” Econometrica, 57(6), 1243-1277.

Allaz, Blaise and Vila, Jean-Luc, (1993), “Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency,” Journal of Economic Theory, 59, pp. 1-16.


5. Multi-Unit Auction Markets — Lecture 5

Wolak, F.A. “Identification and Estimation of Cost Functions Using Observed Bid Data: An Application to Electricity,” Advances in Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume II, Mathias Detwatripont, Lars Peter Hansen, and Stephen J. Turnovsky (editors), Cambridge University Press, 2003, 133-169. (draft on web-site)

Wolak, F.A. (2007), “Quantifying the Supply-Side Benefits from Forward Contracting in Wholesale Electricity Markets, Journal of Applied Econometrics. (draft on web-site).


6. Measuring Unilateral Market Power and Market Performance — Lecture 6

Wolak, Frank A. (2003), “Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets: The California Market 1998 to 2000,” AER, May 2003. (draft on web-site)

McRae, Shaun D. and Wolak, Frank A., “How Do Firms Exercise Unilateral Market Power: Evidence from Bid-Based Multi-Unit Auction Market,” March 2009. (draft on web-site)

Wolak, F.A., “Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis,” Electricity Journal, Aug./Sept. 2003. (draft on web site)


7. Measuring Market Performance — Lecture 7

Borenstein, Severin, Bushnell, James, and Wolak, F.A., “Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California’s Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market,” AER, December 2002. (draft on web-site)

Wolak, Frank A. “Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis,” Electricity Journal, Aug./Sept. 2003. (draft on web site)
 

8. Vertical Relations and Market Power in Gasoline and Electricity — Lecture 8

Borenstein, S., Cameron, C., and Gilbert, R. (1997) “Do Gasoline Prices Respond Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes? ” Quarterly Journal of Economics, volume 112.

Gans, Joshua, and Wolak, Frank A. (2009) “A Comparison of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Vertical Market Power: Evidence from the Electricity Supply Industry” draft on web-site.
 

Leading Research Environment

IFN at the top

 

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The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, IFN, is a private and independent foundation devoted to pursuing highly relevant research for trade and industry.

The researchers at IFN are united in their belief that economic methods offer a powerful tool for understanding society.

The main research programs are:

  1. economics of entrepreneurship
  2. globalization and corporate restructuring
  3. economics of the service sector
  4. economics of the electricity markets
  5. economics of institutions and culture.

Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Grevgatan 34 - 2 fl, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden | Phone: +46-(0)8-665 45 00 | info@ifn.se