Income insurance, bonus and methodological issues.
Some of the questions Assar Lindbeck try to answer in his research:
- How is income insurance affected by social norms?
- How do different bonus arrangements influence asset management?
- What is the strength and weakness in economic methodology?
- Does a monetary union require a fiscal union?
Norms, Incentives and Information in Income Insurance
Assar Lindbeck and Mats Persson
Until 1995 he was director of the Institute of International Economic Studies (IIES) at Stockholm University. Since 1995 he shares his time between IFN and IIES. In recent years his research has focused on unemployment (the insider-outsider theory), problems of the welfare state, the reorganization of firms, and the interplay between economic incentives and social norms.
During 2006 Assar Lindbeck completed a study on economic reforms, social change and social policy in China. Apart from that he worked on a theoretical paper dealing with income insurance with particular emphasis on the interaction between moral hazard and social norms (jointly with Mats Persson).
He also authored two empirical papers. The first one examines interaction effects between labor security legislation and sick leave insurance, and in the second paper (jointly with Mårten Palme and Mats Persson) local variation in sick leave is studied. Assar Lindbeck is also a fellow at CESifo in Munich and Kiel Institute of World Economics.
In 2012 his memoires "Economy är att välja" (Economics is about chosing) was published in Swedish.