2016

An offer You Can’t Refuse: Murdering Journalists as an Enforcement Mechanism of Corrupt Deals

Reprint No. 2016:64

Author(s): Christian Bjørnskov and Andreas FreytagYear: 2016 Title: Public Choice Volume (No.): 167 (3) Pages: 221–243
Online article (restrictions may apply)


Anecdotal evidence suggests that journalists and bureaucrats in some countries are killed when they try to blow the whistle on corruption. We demonstrate in a simple game-theoretical model how murders can serve as an enforcer of corrupt deals under certain regime assumptions. Testing the main implications in an unbalanced panel of 179 countries observed through four periods, we find that corruption is strongly related to the incidence of murders of journalists in countries with almost full press freedom. While our results provide evidence that journalists are killed for corrupt reasons, they also suggest that some countries may have to go through quite violent periods when seeking to secure full freedom of the press.


Reference:
Bjørnskov, Christian and Andreas Freytag (2016), "An offer You Can’t Refuse: Murdering Journalists as an Enforcement Mechanism of Corrupt Deals". Public Choice 167(3), 221–243.

Christian Bjørnskov

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chbj@econ.au.dk

An Agenda for Europe

Institutional Reform for Innovation and Entrepreneurship

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The authors of this book, Niklas Elert, Magnus Henrekson and Mikael Stenkula, advise the economies of the European Union to become more entrepreneurial in promoting innovation and economic growth. The authors propose a reform strategy with respect to several aspects to achieve this goal.

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