Delinquent Networks

Reprint No. 2010:4

Author(s): Coralio Ballester, Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Yves ZenouYear: 2010 Title: Journal of the European Economic Association Volume (No.): 8 (1) Pages: 34–61
Online article (restrictions may apply)

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.

Ballester, Coralio, Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Yves Zenou (2010), "Delinquent Networks". Journal of the European Economic Association 8(1), 34–61.

An Agenda for Europe

Institutional Reform for Innovation and Entrepreneurship

Omslag 2017 Institutional Reform for Innovation and Entrepreneurship.jpg

The authors of this book, Niklas Elert, Magnus Henrekson and Mikael Stenkula, advise the economies of the European Union to become more entrepreneurial in promoting innovation and economic growth. The authors propose a reform strategy with respect to several aspects to achieve this goal.


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