Working Paper No. 689

Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts

Published: January 3, 2007Pages: 50Keywords: Trade Agreement; WTO; GATT; Endogenously Incomplete ContractsJEL-codes: F13; K33; D86

Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi and Robert W. Staiger

We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. Inspite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements.


Henrik Horn


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Sick of Inequality?

An Introduction to the Relationship between Inequality and Health

Sick of Inequality.jpg

In this book Andreas Bergh, Therese Nilsson, IFN and Lund University, and Daniel Waldenström, IFN and Paris School of Economics, France, review the latest research on the relationship between inequality and health. What does inequality mean for our health? Does increasing income inequality affect outcomes such as obesity, life expectancy and subjective well-being?


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To present ongoing research informal brown-bag seminars are held on Mondays at 11:30 am. This is an opportunity for IFN researchers to test ideas and results.

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