Working Paper No. 892

Nuclear Capacity Auctions

Published: December 15, 2011, revised January 2012 and June 2013Pages: 29Keywords: Capacity auctions; investments; market power; nuclear power; virtual power plantsJEL-codes: D44; L12; Q48
Published version

Nuclear Capacity Auctions Sven-Olof Fridolfsson and Thomas Tangerås

We propose nuclear capacity auctions as a means to improve the incentives for investing in nuclear power. In particular, capacity auctions open the market for large-scale entry by outside firms. Requiring licensees to sell a share of capacity as virtual power plant contracts increases auction efficiency by mitigating incumbent producers’ incentive to bid for market power. Our motivating example is Sweden’s recent decision to allow new nuclear power to replace old reactors.

Thomas Tangerås


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Sick of Inequality?

An Introduction to the Relationship between Inequality and Health

Sick of Inequality.jpg

In this book Andreas Bergh, Therese Nilsson, IFN and Lund University, and Daniel Waldenström, IFN and Paris School of Economics, France, review the latest research on the relationship between inequality and health. What does inequality mean for our health? Does increasing income inequality affect outcomes such as obesity, life expectancy and subjective well-being?


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