2013

International Migration, Imperfect Information, and Brain Drain

Särtryck nr 2013:13

Författare: Vianney Dequiedt och Yves ZenouÅr: 2013 Publikation: Journal of Development Economics Årgång (nr): 101 Sidor: 117–132
Artikeln online (behörighet kan krävas)


We consider a model of international migration where skills of workers are imperfectly observed by firms in the host country and where information asymmetries are more severe for immigrants than for natives. Because of imperfect information, firms statistically discriminate high-skilled migrants by paying them at their expected productivity. The decision of whether to migrate or not depends on the proportion of high-skilled workers among the migrants. The migration game exhibits strategic complementarities, which, because of standard coordination problems, lead to multiple equilibria. We characterize them and examine how international migration affects the income of individuals in sending and receiving countries, and of migrants themselves.We also analyze under which conditions there is positive or negative self-selection of migrants.


Referens:
Dequiedt, Vianney och Yves Zenou (2013), "International Migration, Imperfect Information, and Brain Drain". Journal of Development Economics 101(), 117–132.

Aktuell forskare

Carl-Magnus Bjuggren

Forskningsområden: Arbetsmarknadsekonomi, familjeföretag och entreprenörskap.

Några av de frågor Carl-Magnus Bjuggren försöker besvara i sin forskning:

  • Hur påverkas företagens produktivitet av anställningsskydd?
  • Hur påverkas löner och anställningstrygghet av familjeägande?

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