2015

Trust, Leniency and Deterrence

Särtryck nr 2015:62

Författare: Maria Bigoni, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloé Le Coq och Giancarlo SpagnoloÅr: 2015 Publikation: Journal of Law, Economics and Organization Årgång (nr): 31 (4) Sidor: 663–689
Artikeln online (behörighet kan krävas)
Preliminär version


This article presents results from a laboratory experiment studying the channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party, a high fine is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong effect even when the probability of exogenous detection is zero. Deterrence appears to be mainly driven by “distrust”; here, the fear of partners deviating and reporting. Absent leniency, the probability of detection and the expected fine matter more, and low fines are exploited to punish defections. The results appear relevant to several other forms of crimes that share cartels’ strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud.


Referens:
Bigoni, Maria, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloé Le Coq och Giancarlo Spagnolo (2015), "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence ". Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 31(4), 663–689.

Aktuell forskare

Nikita Koptyug

Forskningsområden:  industriell organisation och spelteori.

Några av de frågor Nikita Koptyug försöker besvara med sin forskning:

  • Vilken information använder konsumenter när de fattar beslut om köp av produkter?
  • Kan tillförlitlig information minska asymmetriproblem mellan professionella och icke-professionella köpare?

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