2006–2010

Endogenous Asset Ownership Structures in Deregulated Markets

Särtryck nr 2006:7

Författare: Pehr-Johan Norbäck och Lars PerssonÅr: 2006 Publikation: European Economic Review Årgång (nr): 50 (7) Sidor: 1729–1752


This paper determines the equilibrium ownership structure in an emerging market deregulated by a joint privatization and investment liberalization. It is shown that bidding competition in the privatization stage is not sufficient for reaching an efficient equilibrium market structure. Competition in the ensuing entry stage is also required. Otherwise, one firm can induce another to take the role of the weak firm in the subsequent product market competition, by making concessions in the bidding in the privatization auction. It is also shown that Employment Guarantees may ‘‘help’’ the buyer of the privatized firm ‘‘abstain’’ from investing and thus create a less competitive market structure.


Referens:
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan och Lars Persson (2006), "Endogenous Asset Ownership Structures in Deregulated Markets". European Economic Review 50(7), 1729–1752.

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

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Lars Persson

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Aktuell forskare

Henrik Horn

Forskningsområden: Internationella handels- och investeringsavtal, konkurrenspolitik och marknadsregleringar

Några av de frågor Henrik Horn försöker besvara i sin forskning:

  • Hur ska centrala delar av WTO-avtalet tolkas?
  • Hur bör EU:s miljöpolitik utformas?

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