2006–2010

A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control

Särtryck nr 2007:7

Författare: Sven-Olof FridolfssonÅr: 2007 Publikation: The Political Economy of Antitrust Kapitel: 11Redaktör: Vivek Ghosal and Johan StennekFörlag: ElsevierFörlagsort: Amsterdam Sidor: 287–302


A government wanting to promote an efficient allocation of resources as measured by the total surplus, should strategically delegate to its competition authority a welfare standard with a bias in favor of consumers. A consumer bias means that some welfare increasing mergers will be blocked. This is optimal, if the relevant alternative to the merger is another change in market structure that will even further increase the total surplus. Furthermore, a consumer bias is shown to enhance welfare even though it blocks some welfare increasing mergers when the relevant alternative is the status quo.


Referens:
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof (2007), "A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control". Kapitel 11, sid. 287–302 i Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek, red., The Political Economy of Antitrust. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Aktuell forskare

Henrik Horn

Forskningsområden: Internationella handels- och investeringsavtal, konkurrenspolitik och marknadsregleringar

Några av de frågor Henrik Horn försöker besvara i sin forskning:

  • Hur ska centrala delar av WTO-avtalet tolkas?
  • Hur bör EU:s miljöpolitik utformas?

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