2006–2010

Deadlines and Distractions

Särtryck nr 2008:30

Författare: Maria Sáez-Martí och Anna SjögrenÅr: 2008 Publikation: Journal of Economic Theory Årgång (nr): 143 (1) Sidor: 153–176


We consider a task, demanding a sequence of efforts, that must be completed by a deadline. Effort is not contractible. Agents face shocks to their opportunity cost of time and are sometimes distracted from work. We show that agents who are often distracted may outperform agents who are distracted less often. The reason is that anticipation of distractions induces agents to start earlier for precautionary reasons. Principals can increase the probability of completion, and achieve higher profits, by strategically setting “tight” deadlines, provided that the deadlines can be extended with some positive probability.


Referens:
Sáez-Martí, Maria och Anna Sjögren (2008), "Deadlines and Distractions". Journal of Economic Theory 143(1), 153–176.

Aktuell forskare

Henrik Horn

Forskningsområden: Internationella handels- och investeringsavtal, konkurrenspolitik och marknadsregleringar

Några av de frågor Henrik Horn försöker besvara i sin forskning:

  • Hur ska centrala delar av WTO-avtalet tolkas?
  • Hur bör EU:s miljöpolitik utformas?

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