2006–2010

Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria

Särtryck nr 2008:34

Författare: Andrea AsoniÅr: 2008 Publikation: Journal of Economic Surveys Årgång (nr): 22 (5) Sidor: 953–987


This paper presents a survey of the literature on property rights and economic growth. Different theoretical mechanisms that relate property rights to economic development are discussed. Lack of protection of property rights can result in slow economic growth through different channels: expropriation of private wealth, corruption of civil servants, excessive taxation and barriers to adoption of new technologies. The origins of property rights are also considered. Different theories are illustrated but more attention is paid to the ‘social conflict view’ and its success and limitations. The second part of the paper illustrates relevant empirical works on property rights and growth.


Referens:
Asoni, Andrea (2008), "Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria". Journal of Economic Surveys 22(5), 953–987.

Aktuell forskare

Henrik Horn

Forskningsområden: Internationella handels- och investeringsavtal, konkurrenspolitik och marknadsregleringar

Några av de frågor Henrik Horn försöker besvara i sin forskning:

  • Hur ska centrala delar av WTO-avtalet tolkas?
  • Hur bör EU:s miljöpolitik utformas?

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