2006–2010

Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?

Särtryck nr 2009:3

Författare: Henrik Cronqvist, Fredrik Heyman, Mattias Nilsson, Helena Svaleryd och Jonas VlachosÅr: 2009 Publikation: Journal of Finance Årgång (nr): 64 (1) Sidor: 309–339
Artikeln online (behörighet kan krävas)


Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers’ pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.


Referens:
Cronqvist, Henrik, Fredrik Heyman, Mattias Nilsson, Helena Svaleryd och Jonas Vlachos (2009), "Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?". Journal of Finance 64(1), 309–339.

Fredrik Heyman

Kontakt

Tel: 08 665 4537
fredrik.heyman@ifn.se

Jonas Vlachos

Kontakt

Tel: 08 16 30 46
Mobil: 070 893 3240
jonas.vlachos@ne.su.se

Aktuell forskare

Lars Calmfors

Forskningsområden: Arbetsmarknads- och makroekonomi.

Några av de frågor Lars Calmfors försöker besvara i sin forskning:

  • Orsaker till arbetslöshet?
  • Hur fungerar EMU?
  • Hur kan olika institutionella arrangemang bidra till en lämplig finanspolitik? 

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