2006–2010

Paying to Remove Advertisements

Särtryck nr 2009:46

Författare: Joacim TågÅr: 2009 Publikation: Information Economics and Policy Årgång (nr): 21 (4) Sidor: 245–252
Artikeln online (behörighet kan krävas)


Media firms sometimes allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements from an adbased product. We formally examine an ad-based monopolist’s incentives to introduce this option. When deciding whether or not to introduce the option to pay, the monopolist compares the potential direct revenues from consumers who pay, with the lost advertising revenues resulting from the subsequent ad removal. If the pay alternative is introduced, the media firm increases advertising quantity to make the option to pay more attractive. This outcome hurts consumers but benefits the media firm and the advertisers. Total welfare may increase or decrease. Perhaps surprisingly, more annoying advertisements may lead to an increase in advertising quantity.


Referens:
Tåg, Joacim (2009), "Paying to Remove Advertisements". Information Economics and Policy 21(4), 245–252.

Joacim Tåg

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