Program

--- Tuesday September 15 ---

1130-1300:   Welcome lunch

1300-1400:   Shmuel Oren – UC Berkeley

Three part auctions versus self-commitment in day ahead electricity markets

Discussant: Andrew Philpott – U Auckland 

1400-1415:   Coffee break

1415-1515:   Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr – U Oslo

Market design and investment incentives

Discussant: David Newbery – U Cambridge

1515-1530:   Coffee break

1530-1630:   Peter Cramton – U Maryland

Using forward markets to improve electricity market design

Discussant: Shmuel Oren 

1900:           Conference dinner at Restaurant Gondolen

--- Wednesday September 16 ---

0845-0945:   Frank A. Wolak – Stanford U

Regulating competition in wholesale electricity supply

Discussant: Richard Green – U Birmingham 

0945-1000:   Coffee break

1000-1100:   Pär Holmberg and David Newbery – IFN and U Cambridge

The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions

Discussant: Lawrence Ausubel – U Maryland 

1100-1115:   Coffee break

1115-1215:   Andrew Philpott                 

Production inefficiency of electricity markets with hydro generation

Discussant: Frank A. Wolak 

1215-1330:   Lunch

1330-1430:   Lawrence Ausubel

Virtual power plant auctions

Discussant: Nils-Henrik von der Fehr

1430-1445:   Coffee break

1445-1545:   Richard Green

The long-term impact of wind power on electricity prices and generating capacity

Discussant: Peter Cramton

1545:           Closing of the conference