Sept 2009, Designing electricity auctions
Program
--- Tuesday September 15 ---
1130-1300: Welcome lunch
1300-1400: Shmuel Oren – UC Berkeley
Three part auctions versus self-commitment in day ahead electricity markets
Discussant: Andrew Philpott – U Auckland
1400-1415: Coffee break
1415-1515: Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr – U Oslo
Market design and investment incentives
Discussant: David Newbery – U Cambridge
1515-1530: Coffee break
1530-1630: Peter Cramton – U Maryland
Using forward markets to improve electricity market design
Discussant: Shmuel Oren
1900: Conference dinner at Restaurant Gondolen
--- Wednesday September 16 ---
0845-0945: Frank A. Wolak – Stanford U
Regulating competition in wholesale electricity supply
Discussant: Richard Green – U Birmingham
0945-1000: Coffee break
1000-1100: Pär Holmberg and David Newbery – IFN and U Cambridge
The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions
Discussant: Lawrence Ausubel – U Maryland
1100-1115: Coffee break
1115-1215: Andrew Philpott
Production inefficiency of electricity markets with hydro generation
Discussant: Frank A. Wolak
1215-1330: Lunch
1330-1430: Lawrence Ausubel
Virtual power plant auctions
Discussant: Nils-Henrik von der Fehr
1430-1445: Coffee break
1445-1545: Richard Green
The long-term impact of wind power on electricity prices and generating capacity
Discussant: Peter Cramton
1545: Closing of the conference