Busy Directors: Strategic Interaction and Monitoring Synergies

2017-10-23 Bullfax.com

Bullfax.com writes about the state of markets and the economy. A study by Alexander Ljungqvist et al, NYU and affiliatad to IFN, is presented. The researcher study when having a busy director on the board is harmful to shareholders and when it is beneficial. It shows that "having a busy director on the board is typically only going to be harmful when the firms on whose boards she serves have so little in common informationally that tight time constraints result in negative monitoring synergies".

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The original article at the web site of Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

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