2013

International Migration, Imperfect Information, and Brain Drain

Reprint No. 2013:13

Author(s): Vianney Dequiedt and Yves ZenouYear: 2013 Title: Journal of Development Economics Volume (No.): 101 (March) Pages: 117–132
Online article (restrictions may apply)


We consider a model of international migration where skills of workers are imperfectly observed by firms in the host country and where information asymmetries are more severe for immigrants than for natives. Because of imperfect information, firms statistically discriminate high-skilled migrants by paying them at their expected productivity. The decision of whether to migrate or not depends on the proportion of high-skilled workers among the migrants. The migration game exhibits strategic complementarities,which, because of standard coordination problems, lead to multiple equilibria. We characterize them and examine how international migration affects the income of individuals in sending and receiving countries, and of migrants themselves.We also analyze under which conditions there is positive or negative self-selection of migrants.


Reference:
Dequiedt, Vianney and Yves Zenou (2013), "International Migration, Imperfect Information, and Brain Drain". Journal of Development Economics 101(March), 117–132.

Interdisciplinary European Studies

The European Union in a Changing World Order

Pages-from-2019-Oxelheim-m.gif

This book explores how the European Union responds to the ongoing challenges to the liberal international order. These challenges arise both within the EU itself and beyond its borders, and put into question the values of free trade and liberal democracy. 

About the book

Events

Seminars organized by IFN

 

To present ongoing research informal brown-bag seminars are held on Mondays at 11:30 am. This is an opportunity for IFN researchers to test ideas and results.

Academically oriented seminars are most of the time held on Wednesdays at 10 am. At these events researchers from IFN and other institutions present their research.

In addition, IFN organizes seminars open to the public. Topics for these are derived from the IFN research.

Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Grevgatan 34 - 2 fl, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden | Phone: +46-(0)8-665 45 00 | info@ifn.se