2017

Dynastic Political Rents? Economic Benefits to Relatives of Top Politicians

Reprint No. 2017:57

Author(s): Olle Folke, Torsten Persson and Johanna RickneYear: 2017 Title: Economic Journal Volume (No.): 127 (605) Pages: 495–517
Online article (restrictions may apply)


We exploit close elections in Swedish municipalities to test whether relatives of politicians who become mayors obtain economic benefits. We find no benefits for the siblings of new mayors, but the average earnings of children of newly appointed mayors rise by about 15%. Administrative information on occupational and residence status show that the higher earnings are unlikely reflect an illegitimate allocation of jobs. But the evidence suggests that children of election-winning mayors are more likely to postpone tertiary education and remain in their parents' municipality to work.


Reference:
Folke, Olle, Torsten Persson and Johanna Rickne (2017), "Dynastic Political Rents? Economic Benefits to Relatives of Top Politicians". Economic Journal 127(605), 495–517.

Johanna Rickne

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Trust in the European Union in Challenging Times

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