Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions

Reprint No. 2009:30

Author(s): Pär HolmbergYear: 2009 Title: Journal of Regulatory Economics Volume (No.): 36 (2) Pages: 154–177
Online article (restrictions may apply)

This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction, Demand by the auctioneer is uncertain as in the supply function equilibrium model. A closed form expression is derived for a one shot game. Existence of an equilibrium is ensured if the hazard rate of the demand distribution is monotonically decreasing with respect to the shock outcome and sellers have non-decreasing marginal costs. Multiple equilibria can be ruled out for markets, for which the auctioneer's demand exceeds suppliers' capacity with a positive probability. The derived equilibrium can be used to model strategic bidding behavior in pay-as-bid electricity auctions, such as the balancing mechanism of United Kingdom. Offer curves and mark-ups of the derived equilibrium are compared to results for the SFE of a uniform-price auction.

Holmberg, Pär (2009), "Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions". Journal of Regulatory Economics 36(2), 154–177.

Pär Holmberg


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