Working Paper No. 236

Regulations in Search Markets

Published: December, 1989Pages: 15

Regulations in Search Markets Bo Axell


In a market with information costs, i.e., a search market, the equilibrium formation of prices and outputs will differ significantly from that of a purely competitive market. The equilibrium will be either a monopoly price or a price distribution. Hence, it is normally not a socially optimal situation. The problem discussed in this paper is what kinds of rules and regulations that can be introduced in a search market to improve the solution from a social welfare point of view.

Elgar Companion to

Social Capital and Health

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Martin Ljunge, IFN, is the author of a chapter, "Trust promotes health: addressing reverse causality by studying children of immigrants", in a new book edited by Sherman Folland and Eric Nauenberg. The cutting edge of research is presented, covering the ever-expanding social capital field.

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