Working Paper No. 514

The Auctioning of a Failing Firm

Published: November 23, 1998Pages: 32Keywords: Competition policy, Failing firm defense, AuctionJEL-codes: K21, L13, L41

The Auctioning of a Failing Firm Lars Persson


This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm doctrine in the EU and US merger laws. I combine an oligopoly model with an "endogenous valuations" auction model. Thereby, I take into account that, in an oligopoly, a firm's willingness to pay for the assets depends on the identity of the alternative buyer. The main result is that the doctrine leads to cost inefficiencies, due to a "least danger to competition" (LDC) condition, which favors small, and thus inefficient, firms. In particular, the LDC condition implies that small firms can preempt acquisitions that would lead to both higher producer surplus and higher consumer surplus.

Lars Persson

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Integrating Immigrants into the Nordic Labour Markets

An Overall Perspective

Pages-from-2019-Calmfors-Gassen---Integrating-Immigrants-into-the-Nordic-Labour-Markets.gif

Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden face similar problems of integrating large groups of immigrants, especially low-educated ones from outside the EU, into their labour markets. In this volume, edited by Lars Calmfors, IFN, and Nora Sánchez Gassen in cooperation with researchers from across the Nordic Region analyse how labour market integration of immigrants can be promoted. 

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