Working Paper No. 604

Endogenous Asset Ownership Structures in Deregulated Markets

Published: October 27, 2003Pages: 33Keywords: Privatization; Ownership; FDI; Auctions; Employment GuaranteesJEL-codes: D44; F23; L10; L40

Endogenous Asset Ownership Structures in Deregulated Markets Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars Persson


This paper determines the equilibrium ownership structure in an emerging market deregulated by privatization and investment liberalization. It is shown that bidding competition in the privatization stage is necessary but not sufficient for reaching an efficient equilibrium market structure. Competition in the ensuing entry stage is also necessary. Otherwise, one firm can induce another to take the role of the weak firm in the subsequent product market competition, by making concessions in the bidding in the privatization auction. It is also shown that Employment Guarantees may "help" the buyer of the privatized firm "abstain" from investing and by that creating a less competitive market structure.

 

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

Contact

Ph: +46 8 665 4522
Mob: +46 73 574 3379
pehr-johan.norback@if...

Lars Persson

Contact

Ph: +46 8 665 4504
lars.persson@ifn.se

Interdisciplinary European Studies

The European Union in a Changing World Order

Pages-from-2019-Oxelheim-m.gif

This book explores how the European Union responds to the ongoing challenges to the liberal international order. These challenges arise both within the EU itself and beyond its borders, and put into question the values of free trade and liberal democracy. 

About the book

Events

Seminars organized by IFN

 

To present ongoing research informal brown-bag seminars are held on Mondays at 11:30 am. This is an opportunity for IFN researchers to test ideas and results.

Academically oriented seminars are most of the time held on Wednesdays at 10 am. At these events researchers from IFN and other institutions present their research.

In addition, IFN organizes seminars open to the public. Topics for these are derived from the IFN research.

Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Grevgatan 34 - 2 fl, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden | Phone: +46-(0)8-665 45 00 | info@ifn.se