Optimal Redistribution in the Presence of Signaling

Spencer Bastani, Tomer Blumkin och Luca Micheletto
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October 28, 2021

Abstract

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Our model features signaling in both one and two dimensions, where in the latter case firms have an informational advantage vis-a-vis the government. Focusing on signals in the context of educational attainment, we analyze the dual role of income taxation in redistributing income and affecting signaling incentives as well as the role of extended tax systems that combine income taxation with direct taxes on the signals in the form of education taxes/subsidies. We demonstrate how the government can achieve redistribution through wage compression and analyze the conditions under which such redistribution is feasible and socially desirable.

Keywords: nonlinear taxation, education, asymmetric information, human capital

JEL classification: D82, H21, H52, J31

†Spencer Bastani gratefully acknowledges financial support from Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius stiftelse (grant P2018-162).
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1 Introduction

In the canonical framework of optimal income taxation, pioneered by Mirrlees (1971), asymmetric information between the government and private agents is the major constraint on public policy. The government desires to redistribute between individuals on the basis of their innate productive abilities, but as these abilities cannot be observed for tax purposes, the government has to rely on the taxation of income and other observable quantities, serving as proxies for the (unobserved) abilities. This results in a second-best problem where incentive-compatibility (hereafter, IC) considerations warrant the introduction of distortions, typically taking the form of positive marginal tax rates to mitigate binding IC constraints (with extensive margin choices in place, such as migration and labor market participation, negative marginal tax rates can be desirable).

Since the seminal contributions by Spence (1973) and Akerlof (1976), economists have recognized that asymmetric information in the labor market has a major impact on the nature of interactions between employees and firms, and can be an important source of inefficiency in market outcomes. The presence of a second source of asymmetric information embedded in the market structure also implies that employers cannot observe the productivity of workers, and hence, even in a competitive labor market, workers are not necessarily compensated according to their marginal product. Instead, the wage distribution becomes endogenous, and is affected by the screening/signaling possibilities available to employers/workers.

Two recent papers have revisited the Mirrlees setup and extended it by introducing a second source of asymmetric information between workers and employers. They emphasize how firms screen between workers on the basis of their choice of working hours via inducing high-skill workers to work more than the efficient amount in exchange for a higher compensation (rat-race). Stantcheva (2014) studies how this adverse selection aspect of the labor market affects the design of optimal income taxation, showing that firms’ use of work hours and pay as screening tools can help the government to redistribute as it may constrain the adverse reactions of high types to progressive taxation. Bastani et al. (2015) use a similar screening setup but discuss how the government might choose to use its available policy instruments to affect the wage distribution by
implementing bunching or pooling of types.\footnote{Stantcheva (2014) focuses on the Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence equilibrium whereas Bastani et al. (2015) use the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium concept.} Intuitively, if the government makes it harder for workers and firms to exchange information in the labor market, this can serve redistributive purposes as two workers with different productivity levels may end up with the same market remuneration. Notably, this happens even though the production technology is linear and skill types are perfect substitutes, as in Mirrlees (1971).\footnote{The mechanism is therefore different from the one emphasized by papers studying optimal income taxation in a general equilibrium context where redistribution through the wage channel occurs due to sector re-allocations of labor (see e.g., Stiglitz 1982, Rothschild and Scheuer 2013 and Sachs et al. 2020).}

The purpose of the current paper is to provide a framework to analyze optimal redistributive policy in the presence of (impure) signaling, allowing for both separating and pooling equilibria. In line with the optimal income tax literature, we assume that workers differ in their innate productive abilities which are unobservable to the government. However, in contrast to the vast majority of papers in the optimal income tax literature, but in similarity to the two papers discussed above, we assume that these abilities are also unobservable to prospective employers. The distinguishing feature of our setup is that workers must signal their type to firms through costly effort choices.\footnote{By focusing on signaling, our study is related to Craig (2021) who studies the design of optimal income taxation in a different setup where employers perform Bayesian inference regarding workers’ productivity. In his setting, the equilibrium wage is a weighted average of the worker’s own productivity and the productivity of other similar workers.} Moreover, we allow the information transmission between workers and firms to occur along more than one dimension, and we analyze extended tax systems that combine income taxation with taxes on the signals. As we show, these aspects are essential to understand how optimal redistributive policy should be designed in economies with two layers of asymmetric information. In particular, they determine the feasibility and social desirability of redistribution through wage compression.

The income tax system is an indirect instrument to tax the signaling activities that take place in the labor market. However, in many relevant circumstances, direct instruments affecting the transmission of information between workers and their actual (or prospective) employers can be implemented as well, namely, instruments that tax the signals themselves.\footnote{This topic has received surprisingly little attention in the optimal income tax literature. The only previous contribution we are aware of that explicitly discusses the taxation of signals is Andersson (1996).} These direct instruments may take the form of education mandates,
overtime regulation or worker monitoring technologies. In the standard Mirrlees setup, such direct instruments were ruled out to render the analysis non-trivial, as the possibility to flexibly tax labor hours (alongside income) in the standard Mirrlees framework would imply that the first best allocation could be achieved. With a second source of asymmetric information, however, employers cannot distinguish between workers with different abilities, and need to rely on the observed signals strategically chosen by workers. This implies that in a setting with two layers of asymmetric information, the first-best optimum cannot be achieved, even when direct instruments are available.

Our vehicle of analysis is a model that captures the equity-efficiency trade-off in a similar vein as the two-type Stiglitz (1982) version of the Mirrlees (1971) optimal income tax model. We characterize optimal nonlinear tax policy by solving for a feasible and incentive-compatible allocation invoking the revelation principle and solving for the optimal direct revelation mechanism. To illustrate our framework, we begin the analysis by considering a framework with signaling in one dimension. We then consider the more realistic case in which employers, while still being uninformed about workers’ productivities, possess better information than the government. We do so by assuming that workers’ signaling has two dimensions: quantity (e.g., years of schooling) which is universally observable (that is, both by the government and the employers) and quality (such as the difficulty or intensity of a particular education track) that is exclusively observed by the employers. To render signaling feasible, we assume that workers not only differ in their innate productive ability, but also in their costs of signaling (e.g., in the costs of obtaining education). A natural interpretation of the signals in our model is that they represent components of education effort. In line with this interpretation, the signals in our model are not pure waste, but realistically also enhance human capital.

Our main results can be summarized as follows. With signaling confined to a single dimension, and when only income can be taxed, the social optimum is given by either a separating or a pooling allocation. However, when the income tax is supplemented by a direct tax on the signal, the optimum is always given by a separating allocation. The reason is that a direct tax on the signal enables to fully eliminate the information.

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5Our paper thus relates to papers that study the design of optimal income taxation in the presence of human capital investments and learning-by-doing, see e.g., Stantcheva (2017).
rents associated with differences in productivities, which eliminates the case for redistribution through wage compression (pooling). Due to the presence of a second layer of asymmetric information, however, a first-best is not necessarily attainable, as there remain information rents associated with the differences in the cost of signaling. The presence of binding IC constraints implies that it is optimal for the government to impose distortions on the labor/signaling choices of individuals, distortions that differ from the standard ones typically emphasized in optimal tax models. Interpreting the signal as educational attainment, the case for taxing the signal directly provides a normative justification for education taxes/subsidies, either in the form of price instruments (such as tax credits) or quantity instruments (such as mandates).

In the presence of bi-dimensional signaling, and when only income can be taxed, we show that a pooling equilibrium does not exist and the social optimum is necessarily given by a separating allocation (implying that redistribution through the wage channel is infeasible). However, we show that a pooling equilibrium can be supported by supplementing the income tax with a direct tax levied on the signal observable by the government by eliminating the possibility for cream-skimming. Furthermore, we show that a pooling equilibrium can be socially desirable since a tax on one of the two signals available to agents does not fully eliminate the information rents associated with differences in productivities, as workers still have another avenue to exploit in order to signal their productivity to firms. Thus, when one of the signals is taxed, redistribution through the wage channel is both feasible and sometimes also socially desirable. We illustrate the nature of the social optimum and the associated welfare gains depending on the parameters of the economy through several numerical examples. These examples highlight both the role of the difference in the inherent productivities of agents, as well as the differences in the costs of signaling.

While we present our signaling analysis in a general way, opening up for several different interpretations of the information transmission that takes place between workers and firms, one important context is educational attainment. In the context of educational attainment, government intervention is often justified on efficiency grounds, serving to address common market failures such as alleviating credit constraints and internalizing
externalities, and sometimes on redistributive grounds, viewing the increase in returns to education as a key contributor to the well documented rise in earnings inequality. A frequent feature in many studies (and in common practice) is the desirability of education subsidies. Such subsidies typically serve a dual role of mitigating (or potentially offsetting) the dis-incentivizing effect of income taxation on human capital acquisition; and, enhancing redistribution. In our paper, we demonstrate that both education subsidies and education taxes are warranted on redistributive grounds to mitigate binding IC constraints that restrict the amount of achievable redistribution. Moreover, we emphasize that income taxation and education subsidies/taxes serve as complements in aiding the government to achieve its redistributinal goals.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of signaling in one dimension. Section 3 considers a model with signaling in two dimensions, capturing the possibility for firms to have an informational advantage vis-a-vis the government. Section 4 presents further analytical and numerical characterization of the two-dimensional signaling model. Section 5 concludes.

2 A model with signaling in one dimension

Consider an economy comprised of two types of workers: a low-skilled worker, denoted by $i = 1$, and a high-skilled worker denoted by $i = 2$, who differ in their innate productive ability. The fraction of type-$i$ workers in the population (normalized to a unit measure, with no loss of generality) is denoted by $0 < \gamma^i < 1$. The labor market is competitive, but the innate productive ability of a worker is assumed to be private.
information unavailable to the firm. Thus, we deviate from the standard Mirrleesian setup by considering two layers of asymmetric information, one between the government and private agents, and one between workers and firms.\footnote{Other papers that have considered two layers of asymmetric information are \cite{Stantcheva} and \cite{Bastani}.} Workers exert costly effort denoted by $e^i$ which serves a dual purpose: (i) increasing the output of the worker, and, (ii) signaling innate productive ability. Our model is general, but for concreteness, we focus on educational attainment and make the natural interpretation of $e^i$ as education effort prior to entering the labor market. In line with this interpretation, workers are first-movers in the interaction with firms. We also abstract from labor supply considerations. That is, labor supply is inelastic and normalized to one unit of time.\footnote{Introducing a second stage where workers endogenously decide on their labor supply would not affect the qualitative features of our results.} The output of worker $i$ per unit of time is given by $z^i = e^i \theta^i$ where $\theta^i$ denotes the innate productive ability of type $i$, with $\theta^2 > \theta^1 > 0$. The utility of a type-$i$ worker is given by:

$$u^i(c^i, e^i) = c^i - g^i(e^i),$$

where $c^i$ denotes consumption and $g^i$ denotes the cost of exerting effort and is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly convex. Moreover, the cost of acquiring effort (both marginal and total) decreases with respect to the skill level, i.e., $g^2(e) < g^1(e)$ and $\frac{\partial g^2(e)}{\partial e} < \frac{\partial g^1(e)}{\partial e}$. These are standard properties in the signaling literature and ensure that the single-crossing property, that is essential for the feasibility of a separating (fully revealing) equilibrium, is satisfied. To simplify notation, we let $g^2(e) \equiv g(e)$ and $g^1(e) \equiv k g(e)$ where we assume $k > 1$ so that low-skilled agents incur a higher effort cost, for any given effort level. The firms observe $e^i$, which serves as a signal for the unobserved innate productive ability of the worker.

### 2.1 Laissez-faire equilibrium

We define a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for the signaling game in the absence of government intervention. The signaling game is comprised of two stages. In the first stage, workers choose their level of effort $e^i$, $i = 1, 2$. In the second stage, each firm
offers a labor contract which specifies the income level (which is also the consumption level with no taxes or transfers in place) as a function of the observed effort levels, namely, \( y^i(e^i) \). Based on the observable effort levels, firms form their beliefs with respect to the workers’ types. In equilibrium, choices are consistent in the sense that firms maximize their expected profits by choosing labor contracts, given their beliefs; and, workers maximize their utility by choosing their effort level given the labor contracts offered by firms. Assuming a perfectly competitive labor market with free entry of firms implies that rents are fully dissipated, hence, \( y^i = e^i \theta^i \) and the compensation of all agents is equal to their production.

Due to the asymmetric information between firms and workers (with respect to innate productive ability) a laissez-faire equilibrium has to satisfy IC constraints. In particular, at a separating equilibrium the effort chosen by type-1 agents, \( e^{1*} \), is given by

\[
e^{1*} = \arg\max_{e^1} \left\{ e^1 \theta^1 - kg(e^1) \right\}, \tag{2}
\]

whereas the effort chosen by type-2 agents, \( e^{2*} \), is given by

\[
e^{2*} = \arg\max_{e^2} \left\{ e^2 \theta^2 - g(e^2) \right\} \tag{3}
\]

s.t.

\[
e^{1*} \theta^1 - kg(e^{1*}) \geq e^{2*} \theta^2 - kg(e^{2*}). \tag{4}
\]

According to problem (2), type-1 agents exert their efficient effort level, which is implicitly characterized by the first order condition \( g'(e^1) = \theta^1/k \). Type-2 agents, instead, have to exert an effort level that credibly signals their higher productivity to the firms. This requires that \( e^{2*} \) must satisfy the IC constraint (4). The reason for this constraint is that low-skilled agents may find it desirable to replicate the effort of high-skilled agents in order to receive a higher remuneration (per unit of effort). Therefore, an adverse selection problem generally arises, implying that type-2 workers may be induced to choose an inefficiently high level of effort. As we will see, the possibility

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11 For a more formal treatment see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).

12 The set of contracts \( \{(e^{1*}, e^{1*} \theta^1), (e^{2*}, e^{2*} \theta^2)\} \) represents the unique Nash equilibrium pair of contracts which satisfies the intuitive criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987). We further discuss this commonly applied refinement condition and its policy implications in subsection 2.2.1 below.
of a binding upward constraint carries over to the optimal income tax problem, which implies the possibility of negative optimal marginal tax rates at the top.

### 2.2 The optimal income tax regime

Suppose that the government is seeking to design a nonlinear income tax system that serves redistributive purposes. In particular, assume that the government is invoking a max-min social welfare function and is hence interested in maximizing the utility of the least well-off workers (type-1) subject to a balanced budget constraint (we assume no exogenous revenue needs with no loss of generality).

For later purposes, define the wage rate earned by a given individual as the ratio between his/her pre-tax income and his/her effort. Due to the second layer of asymmetric information between the firms and the workers, the equilibrium wage distribution is affected by the tax-and-transfer system implemented by the government. This enables the government to use the wage channel as a supplementary tool to the standard income channel to attain enhanced redistribution. In particular, the government can, by a proper choice of the tax schedule, implement either a separating or a pooling equilibrium.

#### 2.2.1 A separating equilibrium

In the spirit of the literature on optimal nonlinear income taxation, we assume the income tax is defined by a set of pre-tax/post-tax income bundles denoted by \((y^i, c^i)\) where the total tax (or transfer if negative) is defined by \(t^i \equiv y^i - c^i\). A naive statement of the
problem solved by a government seeking to implement a separating equilibrium is:

$$\max_{\{y^1, c^1, y^2, c^2\}} \left\{ c^1 - kg(e^1) \right\}$$  \quad (5)

subject to:

$$y^i = e^i \theta^i, \quad i = 1, 2$$  \quad (6)

$$c^1 - kg(e^1) \geq c^2 - kg(e^2),$$  \quad (7)

$$c^2 - g(e^2) \geq c^1 - g(e^1),$$  \quad (8)

$$\sum_i \gamma^i (y^i - c^i) = 0.$$  \quad (9)

Conditions (7)-(8) are the standard IC constraints, which ensure no mimicking. Each type weakly prefers his bundle over the one associated with his counterpart. Condition (9) states the government revenue constraint which ensures a balanced budget. Notice that the IC constraints (7)-(8) cannot both be binding at the same time by virtue of the single crossing property (reflected by the fact that $k > 1$).

The intuition for the presence of either a downward or upward binding constraint can be understood as follows. Redistribution from high- to low-skilled agents invites mimicking by high-skilled agents, who might be tempted to earn the income of low-skilled agents in order to qualify for a lower tax burden. In contrast, low-skilled agents might have an incentive to mimic high-skilled agents in order to qualify for a higher wage rate (i.e., for a higher remuneration per unit of effort), even though they would be subject to higher income taxation.

A limitation of the above statement of a separating equilibrium in the presence of an income tax is that it does not consider the possibility for off-equilibrium deviations. In order to accommodate these potential stability threats, we will rely on the extension, provided by Grossman and Perry (1986), of the intuitive criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987), which imposes some natural restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.$^{13}$

Let $T$ denote the set of all types (in our case $T = \{1, 2\}$) and let $S \subseteq T$ denote a subset of $T$. Suppose all types in the subset $S$ deviate by choosing an effort level, $\hat{e}$, different than those specified (for their respective types) in equilibrium. Three questions

need to be asked:

(a) Assuming that all firms believe that the deviating types come from the subset S (and accordingly update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion), what would be the maximum (gross) income that firms could offer? Denote this income by \( \hat{y} \). A deviation to \( \hat{e} \) thus defines a new contract (which is not part of the presumably stable equilibrium) given by the triplet \((\hat{e}, \hat{y}, \hat{c})\), where \( \hat{c} \) denotes the net income associated with \( \hat{y} \).

(b) Would any type \( s \in S \) be strictly better off with \((\hat{e}, \hat{y}, \hat{c})\) than with his equilibrium bundle?

(c) Would any type \( s \notin S \) be weakly better off with the equilibrium bundle than with the contract \((\hat{e}, \hat{y}, \hat{c})\)?

If the answer to both (b) and (c) is yes, then any type in \( S \) finds it profitable to deviate, as he is able to credibly distinguish himself from types that are not in \( S \) and thereby become strictly better off.

Turning back to the separating equilibrium defined above, we acknowledge that the only possible deviations in the presence of the income tax are those associated with the income levels \( y^1 \) and \( y^2 \). Consider a deviation to the following bundle: \((\hat{e}, y^1, c^1)\), where \( \hat{e} = \frac{y^1}{\sum_i \gamma_i \theta_i} \). As \( \theta^2 > \theta^1 \), we have that \( \hat{e} < e^1 = \frac{y^1}{\theta^1} \). It thus follows that type-1 strictly prefers the bundle \((\hat{e}, y^1, c^1)\) over his equilibrium bundle \((e^1, y^1, c^1)\). Now, suppose that \( c^1 - g(\hat{e}) > c^2 - g(e^2) \), namely that type 2 also strictly prefers the bundle \((\hat{e}, y^1, c^1)\) over his equilibrium bundle (which is \((e^2, y^2, c^2)\)). Letting the subset \( S \) be given by \{1, 2\}, it follows that \( y^1 \) is the maximum income level associated with the effort level \( \hat{e} \) in order for the firm not to make negative profits. Moreover the answer for question (b) is affirmative and condition (c) is vacuously satisfied (as there are no types \( s \) which are not in \( S \)). Thus, our suggested equilibrium fails to satisfy the extended intuitive criterion.

It is straightforward to verify that given the income tax schedule, which confines the set of (gross) income levels to the pair \((y^1, y^2)\), the deviation analyzed above is the only threat that challenges the separating equilibrium defined in problem (5). To see this notice that bunching at the higher (gross) income level \( y^2 \) would dictate, by the zero profit condition, an effort level higher than \( e^2 \), which would make it an unattractive deviation.

\[^{14}\text{Notice that in case } S \text{ is confined to be a singleton, we obtain the standard intuitive criterion.}\]
for both types of workers. Modifying the definition of the separating equilibrium to accommodate the extended intuitive criterion yields the following government problem:

$$\max_{\{y^1, e^1, y^2, e^2\}} \left\{ c^1 - kg(e^1) \right\}$$

subject to:

$$y^i = e^i \theta^i, \quad i = 1, 2$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

$$c^1 - kg(e^1) \geq c^2 - kg(e^2),$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

$$c^2 - g(e^2) \geq c^1 - g \left( \sum_i \gamma^i \theta^i \right),$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

$$\sum_i \gamma^i (y^i - c^i) = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

Three remarks are in order. First, notice that the IC constraint given by (13) implies the weaker constraint given by (8) and hence renders the latter redundant. The fact that (13) is a tighter constraint than (8) reflects the presence of an information rent (obtained by type 2) which is associated with the difference in productivities. If the innate productivities were equal, there would be no difference between the two constraints.

Second, notice that the separating allocation obtained under the extended intuitive criterion coincides with the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) separating equilibrium in the screening game, in which the first movers are the firms rather than the workers (who are the first movers in the signaling game). Finally, whereas the IC constraints (7)-(8) satisfy the single-crossing property, thus ensuring that only one of these constraints (typically the one associated with the high-skilled worker) is binding at an optimum, the modified conditions in (12) and (13) may well both bind at the same time. This implies a potential violation of the standard zero marginal tax at the top property (Sadka 1976) which is due to a problem of adverse selection in the labor market.

To get an intuition why constraints (12) and (13) could both be binding under an optimal nonlinear income tax, recall that, under laissez-faire, low-skilled agents may find it attractive to replicate the effort of high-skilled agents in order to receive a higher remuneration (per unit of effort). Thus, absent any government intervention, an upward IC constraint might be binding (low-skilled agents might be tempted to mimic
high-skilled agents) because of the problem of asymmetric information between firms and workers. In the presence of a government redistributing from high- to low-skilled workers, the incentives for low-skilled agents to mimic high-skilled agents are clearly weakened. Under a max-min social welfare function, the downward IC constraint, requiring high-skilled agents not to be tempted to mimic low-skilled agents, will be binding. However, if this constraint implies that high-skilled agents enjoy a sufficiently large information rent associated with differences in productivities, the upward IC constraint will not cease to be binding, implying that both the upward and downward constraint can be binding at the same time.\footnote{The violation of the single crossing property by conditions (12) and (13) stems from the fact that, whereas mimicking low-skilled agents replicate the choices of their high-skilled counterparts, mimicking high-skilled agents choose an effort level strictly lower than that chosen by their low-skilled counterparts. Thus, we are not anymore requiring that two bundles chosen by both types in equilibrium lie along two indifference curves that intersect at a single point (a standard single-crossing argument).}

\subsection*{2.2.2 A pooling equilibrium}

By offering a single income level on the income tax schedule, denoted by \( \hat{y} \), the government can implement a pooling equilibrium, as it can rule out deviations to other income levels than \( \hat{y} \). In a pooling equilibrium, all workers choose the same level of effort \( \hat{e} \). Hence, total production is equal to \( \hat{y} = \hat{e} \bar{\theta} \), where \( \bar{\theta} = \sum_i \gamma_i \theta_i \) is the average productivity. A government seeking to implement a pooling equilibrium will then solve the following problem:

\[
\max_{\hat{y}} \left\{ \hat{c} - kg(\hat{e}) \right\} \quad \text{subject to} \quad \hat{y} = \hat{e} \bar{\theta}, \quad \hat{c} = \hat{y}.
\]  

(15)

Note that pooling is not subject to cream-skimming and is hence stable as the income tax induces full compression of the income distribution (on and off equilibrium).

\subsection*{2.2.3 Comparison between separating and pooling equilibria}

As we pointed out at the end of Section 2.2.1, there is an equivalence between the signaling model (subject to the extended intuitive criterion) and the competitive screening model.\footnote{The possibility to implement a pooling allocation in a two-type optimal income tax model without adverse selection in the labor market was discussed by Stiglitz (1982). However, in that setting, pooling is Pareto-inferior to the laissez-faire allocation.}
Because of this equivalence, the result stated in Proposition 1 of Bastani et al. (2015) also applies to our model with signaling in one dimension. In particular, the social optimum can either be a separating or a pooling equilibrium.

The desirability of a pooling equilibrium derives from the role played by the wage channel in realizing redistributive goals. A pooling equilibrium forces wage equalization and thereby eliminates all the information rent (derived by high-skilled agents) associated with the difference in productivities (but not the information rent associated with the difference in the acquisition costs of the signal). Clearly, however, an evaluation of the relative merits of pooling- versus separating equilibria cannot disregard their respective efficiency properties.[17]

With respect to these properties notice that, under an optimal pooling equilibrium, the first order condition of the government’s problem is \( 1 = k g' \left( \frac{\hat{y}}{\theta} \right) / \theta \). This implies that, while both types of agents choose the same effort, the effort choice of type-1 agents is distorted upwards and that of type-2 agents is distorted downwards. Under an optimal separating equilibrium, instead, the effort choice of type-1 agents is distorted downwards, whereas that of type-2 agents may either be left undistorted or distorted upwards. To see this, consider the problem solved by the government under a separating equilibrium (i.e., the problem given by (10)-(14)). Denoting by \( \lambda^1 \) the Lagrange multiplier attached to the constraint (12), by \( \lambda^2 \) the multiplier attached to the constraint (13) and by \( \mu \) the multiplier attached to the constraint (14), from the first order conditions of the government’s problem it is straightforward to obtain the following:

**Observation 1.** The optimal distortions (wedges) in the scenario with only an income tax in place are given by the following expressions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tau^1_y &\equiv 1 - MRS^1 = 1 - \frac{k g' \left( \frac{y^1}{\theta^1} \right)}{\theta^1} = \lambda^2 \frac{k g' \left( \frac{y^1}{\theta^1} \right)}{\theta^1} - \frac{g' \left( \frac{y^1}{\theta} \right)}{\theta} > 0, \\
\tau^2_y &\equiv 1 - MRS^2 = 1 - \frac{g' \left( \frac{y^2}{\theta^2} \right)}{\theta^2} = \lambda^1 \frac{g' \left( \frac{y^2}{\theta^2} \right)}{\theta^2} - (1 - k) \leq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

\[17\]See also Riley (2001, pp. 445-46).

\[18\]A more detailed characterization of the conditions under which the pooling equilibrium welfare-dominates the separating equilibrium in the context of screening with only an income tax in place is provided in Bastani et al. (2015) (see especially the discussion following Proposition 2).
Given our focus on a max-min social welfare function, constraint (13) is necessarily binding ($\lambda^2 > 0$), implying that the right hand side of (16), which provides a measure of the distortion imposed on $y^1$, is unambiguously positive. On the other hand, the right hand side of (17), which provides a measure of the distortion imposed on $y^2$, will either be zero (if constraint (12) is slack, i.e. $\lambda^1 = 0$) or it will be negative (if constraint (12) is binding, i.e. $\lambda^1 > 0$, recalling that $k > 1$).

2.3 The extended tax regime

We now extend our tax base and allow the government to tax each individual based on two observable characteristics: (i) earned income, (ii) the signal transmitted in the labor market. Thus, the tax function that we consider is a nonlinear and nonseparable function of both $y$ and $e$. We maintain all our earlier assumptions and in particular the asymmetry in information between firms and workers with respect to the latter’s innate productive ability. Moreover, we focus on the separating equilibrium as the pooling equilibrium, in the extended tax regime, is identical to the one under the income tax regime.\(^\text{19}\)

In designing a separating equilibrium under an extended tax regime, the problem solved by the government is the following:

$$\max_{\{y^1, c^1, e^1, y^2, c^2, e^2\}} \left\{ c^1 - kg(e^1) \right\}$$

subject to:

$$y^i = e^i \theta^i, \quad i = 1, 2,$$

$$c^1 - kg(e^1) \geq c^2 - kg(e^2),$$

$$c^2 - g(e^2) \geq c^1 - g(e^1),$$

$$\sum_i \gamma^i (y^i - c^i) = 0.$$

Comparing the constraints (19)-(22) with the corresponding constraints under the income tax regime, i.e. constraints (11)-(14), one can see that the difference between the two regimes is confined to the IC constraint associated with the high-skill type. The

\(^{19}\)Either an income tax or a tax on the signal can be used to implement a pooling equilibrium.
possibility to tax $e$ prevents agents from choosing effort levels other than those specified in the bundles $(y^1, c^1, e^1)$ and $(y^1, c^2, e^2)$. This implies that the stability threat posed by the extended intuitive criterion is no longer feasible: a type-2 worker behaving as a mimicker, i.e. earning $y^1$ in order to benefit from a more lenient tax treatment, is forced to choose the same effort level prescribed in equilibrium for a type-1 worker. In contrast to what happened under the pure income tax regime considered in Section 2.2.1 high-skilled agents no longer enjoy an information rent associated with the innate difference in productivities. Under an extended tax regime, the amount of achievable redistribution is solely determined by the differences in the costs of acquiring the signal.

By alleviating one of the IC constraints that limit the amount of feasible redistribution, the extended tax regime allows to increase social welfare relative to the case with only an income tax in place. This result, which has important policy implications, is formally stated in Proposition 1 below. Proposition 1 also provides two additional results. First, it shows that the possibility to tax the signal renders a pooling equilibrium socially undesirable for any difference in productivities between the two types of workers and independently of the difference in the acquisition cost of the signal. This result, which is in contrast to what was the case under the optimal income tax regime, is related to the fact that, by replacing the right hand side of (13) with the right hand side of (21), the single-crossing condition is restored (since constraints (20), (21) cannot be binding at the same time).

Second, the proposition shows that the optimal distortions are unrelated to the differences in productivities.

**Proposition 1.** In the extended tax regime, the following holds:

(i) the social optimum is always attained by a separating allocation, namely, a pooling allocation is never optimal;

(ii) social welfare is strictly higher than under the optimal income tax regime;

(iii) the optimal distortions (wedges) in the extended tax regime are unrelated to the

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Notice that the set of constraints (19)-(22) is identical to the set of constraints (6)-(9) that characterized the naive statement of the government’s problem under a pure income tax regime.
differences in productivities and they take the form:

\[ \tau_1^1 \equiv 1 - MRS^1 = \frac{\gamma^2 \ g' (e^1) (k - 1)}{\theta^1} = \frac{\gamma^2}{k - \gamma^2} (k - 1) > 0, \quad (23) \]

\[ \tau_2^1 \equiv 1 - MRS^2 = 0. \quad (24) \]

**Proof**

**Part (i)** Suppose by negation that for some \( \theta^2 > \theta^1 > 0 \) the social optimum is given by a pooling allocation, which satisfies, \( \hat{c} = \hat{y} = \hat{e} \cdot \sum \gamma^i \theta^i \). To show that pooling is suboptimal, consider the following reform starting from an initial pooling equilibrium:

\[ \tilde{e}^1 = \hat{e} - \epsilon, \quad \tilde{c}^1 = \hat{c} - \epsilon kg' (\hat{e}), \quad (25) \]

\[ \tilde{e}^2 = \hat{e} + \delta, \quad \tilde{c}^2 = \hat{c} + \delta g' (\hat{e}), \quad (26) \]

where \( \epsilon > 0 \) and \( \delta > 0 \). By construction, the reform is welfare neutral for both types of workers since we have that \( dU^1 = dc - (kg') de = -\epsilon kg' (\hat{e}) + \epsilon kg' (\hat{e}) = 0 \) and \( dU^2 = dc - (g') de = \delta g' (\hat{e}) - \delta g' (\hat{e}) = 0 \). Notice also that, after the reform is implemented, no agent is tempted to behave as a mimicker. By behaving as a mimicker, the utility of a type-1 agent would change by \( \delta g' (\hat{e}) - \delta kg' (\hat{e}) < 0 \) (since \( k > 1 \)). Similarly, by behaving as a mimicker, the utility of a type-2 agent would change by \( -\epsilon kg' (\hat{e}) + \epsilon g' (\hat{e}) < 0 \) (since \( k > 1 \)). Let’s now consider the effect of the proposed reform on the net revenue collected by the government. We know that net revenue is 0 in the initial equilibrium. Net revenue after the reform is equal to the difference between the variation in aggregate output and the variation in aggregate consumption:

\[ dY - dC = \left[ \frac{\gamma^2 \delta \theta^2 - \gamma^1 \epsilon \theta^1}{dY} \right] - \left[ \frac{\gamma^2 \delta - \gamma^1 \epsilon k}{dC} \right] g' (\hat{e}) = \gamma^2 \delta \left[ \theta^2 - g' (\hat{e}) \right] - \gamma^1 \epsilon \left[ \theta^1 - kg' (\hat{e}) \right]. \quad (27) \]

Notice that \( dY - dC \) will be necessarily positive when at the initial pooling equilibrium we have \( \theta^2 - g' (\hat{e}) > 0 \) and \( \theta^1 - kg' (\hat{e}) < 0 \). Notice also that it is not possible that at the initial pooling equilibrium we have at the same time that \( \theta^2 - g' (\hat{e}) < 0 \) and
\(\theta^1 - kg' (\bar{e}) > 0\) (this is due to the fact that \(\theta^2 > \theta^1\) and \(k > 1\)). Suppose then that at the initial pooling equilibrium we have that \(\theta^2 - g' (\bar{e}) > 0\) and \(\theta^1 - kg' (\bar{e}) > 0\). Thus, net revenue increases whenever \(\delta > \frac{\theta^1 - kg'(\bar{e})}{\theta^2 - g'(\bar{e})}\). In other words, there exists a reform to the presumed optimal allocation that yields a fiscal surplus which can be rebated to the workers in a lump-sum fashion without violating the IC constraints (due to the quasi-linearity of preferences). Hence, a Pareto improvement can be obtained. This gives us the desired contradiction.

**Part (ii)** It suffices to show that the welfare level associated with a separating equilibrium is higher under the extended tax regime than under the pure income tax regime. This follows from the fact that the pooling equilibrium yields the same welfare level under the two tax regimes. Thus, in case the optimal solution under a pure income tax regime calls for implementing a pooling equilibrium, it is clearly dominated by the optimal solution under the extended tax regime, by virtue of part (i) of the proposition. In the optimal separating equilibrium under an income tax regime, the incentive compatibility constraint associated with type-2 workers [given by condition (13)] is binding. Otherwise, by continuity considerations one could transfer units of consumption from type-2 to type-1 workers and enhance the latter’s level of utility, without violating the incentive compatibility constraint associated with type-2 workers (and clearly without violating the revenue constraint). Under an extended tax regime, the incentive constraint in (13) is replaced by the weaker constraint given by (21). Thus, the optimal separating equilibrium under the pure income tax regime satisfies the reformulated incentive constraint [given in (21)] as a strict inequality.21 This slack allows the government to enhance the utility of type-1 by slightly increasing the income tax levied on type-2 while increasing the transfer given to type-1, without violating the IC constraint of type 2, maintaining budget balance (by continuity considerations). This establishes part (ii).

---

21The only (knife-edge) cases in which no slack exists are when either \(\theta^1 = 0\), or, \(\theta^1 = \theta^2\).
Part (iii) We begin by showing that constraints (20) and (21) cannot be binding at the same time. Assume by contradiction that they are both binding. From (20) we get:

\[ c^1 = c^2 + k \left[ g(e^1) - g(e^2) \right]. \]  

(28)

Substituting for \( c^1 \) in (21) the RHS of the equation above gives:

\[ c^2 - g(e^2) = c^2 + k \left[ g(e^1) - g(e^2) \right] - g(e^1) \iff (1 - k) \left[ g(e^1) - g(e^2) \right] = 0, \]  

(29)

a result that cannot hold under a separating equilibrium (where \( e^1 \neq e^2 \)) given that \( k \neq 1 \). Having established that constraints (20) and (21) cannot be binding at the same time, and given the max-min social welfare function, we will hereafter assume that constraint (20) is slack. Denote by \( \delta_i \), for \( i = 1, 2 \), the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraint (19), by \( \lambda \) the multiplier associated with the constraint (21), and by \( \mu \) the multiplier associated with the constraint (22). The first order conditions of the government’s problem (with respect to, respectively, \( y^2, e^2, c^2, y^1, e^1, c^1 \)) are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\delta^2 &= \mu \gamma^2 \\
\delta^2 \theta^2 - \lambda g'(e^2) &= 0 \\
\lambda &= \mu \gamma^2 \\
\delta^1 &= \mu \gamma^1 \\
\delta^1 \theta^1 - k g'(e^1) + \lambda g'(e^1) &= 0 \\
1 - \lambda &= \mu \gamma^1
\end{align*}
\]  

(30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35)

Using (32) to substitute \( \mu \gamma^2 \) for \( \lambda \) in (35) gives the result that \( \mu = 1 \). From (30) we then obtain that \( \delta^2 = \gamma^2 \), and from (32) we obtain that \( \lambda = \gamma^2 \). Thus, one can rewrite (31) as \( \gamma^2 \left[ \theta^2 - g'(e^2) \right] = 0 \), which implies that \( 1 = g'(e^2) / \theta^2 \), i.e., (24) is satisfied. Exploiting the fact that \( \mu = 1 \) and therefore, from (33), \( \delta^1 = \gamma^1 \), we can rewrite (34) as

\[ kg'(e^1) = \lambda g'(e^1) + \gamma^1 \theta^1. \]  

(36)
Since (35) can be equivalently rewritten (taking into account that $\mu = 1$) as $1 = \lambda + \gamma^1$, combining (36) with (35) allows obtaining that

$$kg'(e^1) [\lambda + \gamma^1] = \lambda g'(e^1) + \gamma^1 \theta^1,$$

from which one gets (exploiting that $\lambda = \gamma^2$):

$$1 - \frac{kg'(e^1)}{\theta^1} = \frac{\gamma^2 g'(e^1)}{\gamma^1 - \theta^1} (k - 1).$$

The RHS of (38) provides a measure of the distortion imposed on type-1 agents for self-selection reasons and is strictly positive, implying that the effort provided by type-1 agents is downward distorted. Since from (36) we obtain (taking into account that $\lambda = \gamma^2$) that $g'(e^1) / \theta^1 = \gamma^1 / (k - \gamma^2)$, we can restate (38) as (23).

Several remarks are in order. First, Proposition 1 highlights that levying an implicit positive marginal income tax on type 1 agents mitigates the information rent associated with the differences in the acquisition cost of the signal. This enables the extraction of more tax revenue from type 2 agents. Second, if asymmetric information between workers and firms were absent, each agent would choose $e$ such that $\theta^i = k^i g'(e^i)$, hence we would obtain $\tau^1_y = \tau^2_y = 0$. In our setup, with a second layer of asymmetric information, the first best is unattainable but, nonetheless, a tax on the signal can enhance welfare. Third, the reason that the optimal distortions are unrelated to the differences in productivities derives from the fact that the tax on the signal fully eliminates the information rents associated with these differences (by forcing a mimicking high-skilled agent to acquire the same level of education as the mimicked low-type).

The qualitative features of Proposition 1, which focuses on the two-type case, generalize to the case with $N > 2$ types. In particular, a pooling allocation is never optimal and social welfare is strictly higher than under the optimal income tax regime. Moreover, one can show that some of the bunching configurations that are optimal (depending on the specific parametric assumptions) under the income tax regime, become
sub-optimal in the extended tax regime\textsuperscript{22} However, whereas a separating equilibrium is always optimal in the two-type case, for $N > 2$ the optimality of a fully separating equilibrium hinges on the fulfillment of a necessary and sufficient condition. Denoting by $k^i$ the cost of acquiring education for type-$i$ agents and by $\gamma^i$ their proportion in the population, this condition requires that, $\forall i \in \{1, ..., N - 1\}$:

$$
\frac{\gamma^{i+1} \theta^{i+1}}{\gamma^{i+1} k^{i+1} + (k^{i+1} - k^{i+2}) \left( \sum_{j \geq i+2} \gamma^j \right)} > \frac{\gamma^i \theta^i}{\gamma^i k^i + (k^i - k^{i+1}) \left( \sum_{j \geq i+1} \gamma^j \right)}.
$$

(39)

A heuristic derivation of condition (39) is presented in the supplementary material.

When condition (39) is satisfied, a fully separating equilibrium is optimal and one can obtain the following generalized version of (23), which applies for $i = 1, ..., N$\textsuperscript{23}.

$$
\tau^i_y \equiv 1 - MRS^i = \frac{\sum_{j \geq i+1} \gamma^j g'(e^i)(k^i - k^{i+1})}{\gamma^i \theta^i} = \frac{(k^i - k^{i+1}) \left( \sum_{j \geq i+1} \gamma^j \right)}{(k^i - k^{i+1}) \left( \sum_{j \geq i+1} \gamma^j \right) + \gamma^i k^i}.
$$

(40)

The first thing to notice about (40) is that, for $i = N$, it implies that $\tau^N_y = 0$ (given that $\sum_{j \geq N+1} \gamma^j = 0$) and that for $i = 1, ..., N - 1$ it implies that $0 < \tau^i_y < 1$. The second thing to notice about (40) is that it confirms the property of Proposition 1 that the optimal distortions are unrelated to the differences in productivities. The intermediate step in (40) highlights that the optimal marginal tax rates are increasing with respect to both the inverse hazard rate of the skill distribution and the information rent associated with the differences in the costs of acquiring the signal across adjacent types. The final step in (40) highlights that the marginal tax rate faced by agents of type $i$ is increasing in $(k^i - k^{i+1}) \left( \sum_{j \geq i+1} \gamma^j \right)$. As we discuss in the supplementary material, this term represents the amount of resources that would be needed to preserve IC if type-$i$ agents were induced to marginally raise their effort.

The general lesson from Proposition 1 and its extension to the $N > 2$ case, is that when signaling occurs in one dimension, and this dimension of signaling can be taxed,

\textsuperscript{22}For example, in the three-type case, one can show that bunching involving types 2 and 3 will never be an optimal solution under the extended tax regime, whereas it will be optimal in the income tax regime under certain parametric assumptions.

\textsuperscript{23}The full derivations are skipped for the sake of brevity and are available upon request.
the case for redistribution through the wage channel is weakened. Moreover, the analysis highlights that income taxes and education taxes/subsidies are complements as they serve distinct purposes in helping the government to achieve its redistributive goals.

In the context of our two-type model, an alternative to levying a fully nonlinear tax on education would be to set a binding education mandate at the level of education associated with type-1 workers under the separating optimal allocation. By doing so, type-2 mimickers would be denied the information rent associated with the difference in productivities between the two types of agents. The mandate essentially blocks the possibility, for type-2 mimickers, to credibly signal their superior productive ability to the firm. This serves to enhance redistribution. Our analysis therefore suggests a novel normative justification for education mandates, often warranted on efficiency grounds (internalization of positive spillovers, mitigating imperfections in capital markets etc.)

3 A model with signaling in two dimensions

We now extend the setting analyzed in section by considering the availability of two signals. The first signal is denoted by $e_s$, and represents the quantity of effort. The second signal is denoted by $e_q$, and represents the intensity of effort. In the context of education, the variables $e_s$ and $e_q$ would capture, respectively, the quantity (for example, the time spent in acquiring vocational training and/or academic degrees) and quality (for instance, GPA, reputation of certifying institute, etc.) dimensions of educational attainment. In the context of labor supply, $e_s$ and $e_q$ would respectively capture the time and intensity components of labor effort. We assume that $e_s$ is observed by both the government and the firms, whereas $e_q$ is only observed by the firms (or prohibitively costly to observe by the government). The output of a type-$i$ worker is given by the production function:

$$z_i = h(e_s^i, e_q^i) \theta^i, \quad (41)$$

See, e.g., Balestrino et al. (2016).
where $h(\cdot)$ is jointly concave and strictly increasing in both arguments. The utility function is given by:

$$u^i(c^i, e^i_s, e^i_q) = c^i - R^i(e^i_s, e^i_q),$$  \hspace{1cm} (42)

where $c^i$ denotes consumption and

$$R^i(e^i_s, e^i_q) = p^i_s e^i_s + p^i_q e^i_q$$  \hspace{1cm} (43)

is the cost function for type-$i$ agents, with $p^i_s$ and $p^i_q$ denoting, respectively, the unitary price of $e_s$ and the unitary price of $e_q$ for an agent of type $i$. Regarding the prices $p^i_s$ and $p^i_q$ we will hereafter make the following assumptions:

$$p^1_s = p^2_s \equiv p_s \quad \text{and} \quad p^1_q > p^2_q,$$  \hspace{1cm} (44)

which jointly imply that type-2 agents have a comparative advantage in the quality signal $e_q$. Before turning to the government problem, we define the laissez-faire.

### 3.1 Laissez-faire market equilibrium

The two-stage signaling game in the presence of two-dimensional signals works as follows. In the first stage, workers choose their levels of effort (both quality and quantity components), $(e^i_s, e^i_q); i = 1, 2$. In the second stage each firm offers a labor contract which specifies the income level (which is also the consumption level with no taxes/transfers in place) as a function of the observed signals, namely, $y(e^i_s, e^i_q)$. Based on the observed signals, firms form their beliefs with respect to the workers’ types. In equilibrium, choices are consistent in the sense that firms maximize their expected profits by choosing the labor contracts, given their beliefs; and, workers maximize their utility by choosing their signal effort levels given the labor contracts offered by the firms. Assuming a perfectly competitive labor market with free entry of firms implies that rents are fully dissipated, hence, $y^i = h(e^i_s, e^i_q)\theta^i$.

To illustrate the framework, consider the following laissez-faire allocation given by
the pairs \((e_{s}^{i*}, e_{q}^{i*})\), \(i = 1, 2\), satisfying the following conditions:

\[
(e_{s}^{1*}, e_{q}^{1*}) = \arg\max_{e_{s}^{1}, e_{q}^{1}} \left\{ h(e_{s}^{1}, e_{q}^{1})\theta^{1} - R^{1}(e_{s}^{1}, e_{q}^{1}) \right\},
\]

(45)

and

\[
(e_{s}^{2*}, e_{q}^{2*}) = \arg\max_{e_{s}^{2}, e_{q}^{2}} \left\{ h(e_{s}^{2}, e_{q}^{2})\theta^{2} - R^{2}(e_{s}^{2}, e_{q}^{2}) \right\}
\]

(46)

subject to:

\[
h(e_{s}^{1*}, e_{q}^{1*})\theta^{1} - R^{1}(e_{s}^{1*}, e_{q}^{1*}) \geq h(e_{s}^{2*}, e_{q}^{2*})\theta^{2} - R^{2}(e_{s}^{2*}, e_{q}^{2*}),
\]

(47)

which has a similar structure to the problem illustrated in section 2.1. The above IC constraint reflects the fact that type-1 workers might have an incentive to mimic their higher-skilled counterparts in order to be remunerated according to the (higher) productivity of type-2 agents. If the constraint is binding, an adverse selection problem arises, implying that type-2 workers are induced to over-invest in the quality-signal \(e_{q}\) (due to their comparative advantage in this dimension of signaling).

### 3.2 The optimal income tax regime

We first consider the benchmark setup where an individual’s tax liability is just a function of his/her earned income. We assume, like we did for the case of signaling in one dimension, that the government is invoking a max-min social welfare function. The income tax is, as before, defined by a set of pre-tax/post-tax income bundles denoted by \((y^{i}, c^{i})\) where the total tax (or transfer if negative) is defined by \(t^{i} \equiv y^{i} - c^{i}\). We define the wage rate earned by a given individual as the ratio between his/her pre-tax income \(y\) and the value of the \(h\)-function evaluated at the effort vector chosen by the individual, thereby generalizing the definition of wage rate provided in Section 2.2.

#### 3.2.1 A separating equilibrium

Under a separating equilibrium, the tax schedule is designed in such a way to induce type-1 agents to select a bundle \((y^{1}, c^{1})\) with associated tax payment \(t^{1} = y^{1} - c^{1} < 0\),
and to induce type-2 agents to select a bundle \((y^2, c^2)\) with associated tax payment 
\[ t^2 = y^2 - c^2 > 0 \]. Type-\(i\) agents choosing the bundle intended for them on the tax schedule would choose an efficient mix of \(e_s\) and \(e_q\), denoted by \((e^i_s(y^i), e^i_q(y^i))\), \(i = 1, 2\), with an associated cost given by:

\[
R^i(y^i) = \min_{e_s, e_q} R^i(e_s, e_q) \quad \text{subject to} \quad h(e_s, e_q)\theta^i = y^i. \tag{48}
\]

Notice that efficiency in the choice of the effort mix means that \(e^i_s(y^i)\) and \(e^i_q(y^i)\) satisfy the condition

\[
\frac{\partial h \left( e^i_s(y^i), e^i_q(y^i) \right) / \partial e^i_s}{\partial h \left( e^i_s(y^i), e^i_q(y^i) \right) / \partial e^i_q} = \frac{p_s}{p_q}, \tag{49}
\]

which equates the marginal rate of technical transformation (MRTS) to the price ratio. Moreover, notice that under a separating equilibrium, agents are paid by the firm according to their true productivity (a type \(i\) agent is paid a wage rate of \(\theta^i\)).

To implement a given separating equilibrium, the government has to guard against various deviating strategies available to agents, i.e. the government has to make sure that no agent has an incentive to deviate from the behavior expected from him/her. There are in principle three deviating strategies that may be adopted by an agent of type \(i\) choosing to earn the income \(y^j\) intended for the other type. The agent can choose an effort vector that enables him/her to get remunerated according to: (i) the productivity of the other type, (ii) the average productivity, or, (iii) his/her true productivity. We consider these three deviating strategies in more detail below. Given that a deviating agent is someone who earns an amount of income which is intended for some other type of agents, we will follow the common practice of using the word ”mimicker” to refer to a deviating agent in all three cases.

A first deviating strategy is for type-\(i\) agents to earn the income level \(y^j\) by choosing the effort mix \((e^i_s(y^j), e^i_q(y^j))\) chosen in equilibrium by type-\(j\) agents. Behaving in this way, a type-\(i\) mimicker would be paid a wage rate \(\theta^i\) (i.e., according to the productivity
of the type being mimicked) and would incur the following cost:

\[ \hat{R}^i(y^j) = p_s^i \hat{e}_s^i(y^j) + p_q^i \hat{e}_q^i(y^j), \]  

(50)

where \((\hat{e}_s^i(y^j), \hat{e}_q^i(y^j)) = (e_s^j(y^j), e_q^j(y^j))\) denotes the effort mix of a type \(i\) mimicker, which is identical to the effort mix chosen in equilibrium by agents of type \(j\). Notice that \((\hat{e}_s^i(y^j), \hat{e}_q^i(y^j))\) is, from the perspective of type-\(i\) agents, a distorted effort mix, in the sense that it does not satisfy the condition

\[ \frac{\partial h(e_s, e_q)}{\partial e_s} \frac{\partial h(e_s, e_q)}{\partial e_q} = p_s. \]

Besides the deviating strategy described above, which involves a type-\(i\) mimicker choosing the effort vector selected in equilibrium by agents of type \(j \neq i\), there are also deviating strategies that involve the choice, by a mimicker, of an off-equilibrium effort vector. The first of such strategies is the possibility for a type-\(i\) agent to earn the income level \(y^j\) by choosing an effort vector which is at the same time: i) different from the one chosen in equilibrium by type-\(j\) agents, ii) attractive also for type-\(j\) agents, and iii) sufficient to allow firms to make non-negative profits when remunerating agents according to the average productivity \(\bar{\theta} \equiv \gamma_1 \theta_1 + \gamma_2 \theta_2\). For a type-\(i\) mimicker, the most attractive such strategy is the one with associated cost given by:

\[ \hat{R}^i(y^j) = \min_{(e_s, e_q) \neq (e_s^j(y^j), e_q^j(y^j))} R^i(e_s, e_q) \]  

subject to:

\[ R^i(e_s, e_q) \leq R^i(y^j), \]  

(52)

\[ y^j \leq h(e_s, e_q) \bar{\theta}. \]  

(53)

The constraint (52) captures the fact that the deviating strategy is feasible insofar as it induces also type-\(j\) agents to change their effort vector. The constraint (53) ensures that the effort vector is enough to deliver a non-negative profit for the hiring firm in a pooling equilibrium where both agents are paid according to the average productivity \(\bar{\theta} \equiv \gamma_1 \theta_1 + \gamma_2 \theta_2\). Lemma[1] shows that this off-equilibrium deviation is only feasible for type 2 agents.

Lemma 1. Type-1 agents cannot succeed in earning \(y^2\) while being remunerated according to the average productivity \(\bar{\theta}\).
Proof Under the suggested deviating strategy both types of workers would earn $y^2$ while being paid according to the average productivity $\bar{\theta}$ and exerting the same effort vector $(e_s, e_q)$ satisfying $h(e_s, e_q)\bar{\theta} \geq y^2$. However, recalling that the equilibrium effort vector chosen by type-2 agents at the income level $y^2$ is efficient, type 2 agents cannot be induced to prefer such an allocation. The reason is that, since they would be remunerated according to $\bar{\theta}$ rather than according to their true productivity $\theta^2$, they would necessarily be forced to adopt a more costly effort vector.

The next Lemma shows that the off-equilibrium strategy with cost $\hat{R}^2(y^1)$ is always superior (in the sense of being less costly) for type-2 agents relative to the mimicking strategy of replicating the effort vector chosen in equilibrium by agents of type 1.

Lemma 2. $\hat{R}^2(y^1) < \hat{R}^2(y^1)$.

Proof Let $(e_s^1(y^1), e_q^1(y^1))$ denote the effort vector chosen by type-1 agents at the bundle intended for them by the government, and let $\bar{e}_s = e_s^1(y^1) - \epsilon$ and $\bar{e}_q = e_q^1(y^1) - \epsilon$, for small $\epsilon > 0$, represent a candidate effort vector for a type-2 mimicker. As $\bar{\theta} > \theta^1$ and $y^1 = h(e_s^1(y^1), e_q^1(y^1)) \cdot \theta^1$, it follows by continuity that $h(\bar{e}_s, \bar{e}_q) \cdot \bar{\theta} > y^1$. Hence, the suggested effort vector does not violate the constraint requiring firms to make non-negative profits. By construction, $R^2(\bar{e}_s, \bar{e}_q) < \hat{R}^2(y^1)$ and $R^1(\bar{e}_q, \bar{e}_s) < R^1(y^1)$, so the candidate effort vector is preferred by both types of workers and induces pooling. Moreover, by virtue of the fact that $\hat{R}^2(y^1)$ represents the minimal cost for type 2 under a pooling equilibrium, we have that $\hat{R}^2(y^1) \leq R^2(\bar{e}_s, \bar{e}_q)$. Thus, it follows that $\hat{R}^2(y^1) < \hat{R}^2(y^1)$. This completes the proof.

Notice that Lemma 2 admits an intuitive interpretation. It states that for a type-2 agent it is always more attractive to earn $y^1$, while being remunerated according to the average productivity $\bar{\theta}$, compared to earning $y^1$, while being remunerated according to the productivity $\theta^1 < \bar{\theta}$.

The other deviating strategy that involves the choice of an off-equilibrium effort vector is the one where type-i agents replicate the earned income $y^j$ of type-j agents, but invest in the signals in such a way so as to separate themselves from type j agents,
thereby succeeding in being remunerated by firms according to their true productivity $\theta^i$. For a type-$i$ mimicker, the most attractive such deviating strategy is the one with associated cost given by:

$$
\tilde{R}^i(y^j) = \min_{(e_s,e_q)\neq(e_s(y^j),e_q(y^j))} R^i(e_s, e_q) \tag{54}
$$

subject to:

$$
R^j(e_s, e_q) \geq R^j(y^j), \tag{55}
$$

$$
y^j \leq h(e_s, e_q)\theta^i. \tag{56}
$$

In the problem above, constraint (55) ensures that the effort vector chosen by type-$i$ mimickers is not attractive for type-$j$ agents, thereby allowing type-$i$ mimickers to separate themselves from their type-$j$ counterparts. The constraint (56) ensures instead that the effort vector chosen by type-$i$ mimickers is sufficient to produce $y^j$. Notice that since $\theta^2 > \theta^1$, and given our assumptions that $p_s^2 = p_s^2 \equiv p_s$ and $p_q^1 > p_q^2$, it necessarily follows that $\tilde{R}^2(y^1) < R^1(y^1)$ and $\tilde{R}^1(y^1) > R^2(y^2)$. Notice also that there are two possible scenarios in which type-$i$ agents succeed in separating themselves from type-$j$ agents at the income level $y^j$: one in which constraint (55) is binding, and another in which it is slack. In the former case, the agent behaving as a mimicker will employ a distorted effort mix (i.e., an effort mix violating the condition $\partial h(e_s, e_q)/\partial e_s \partial h(e_s, e_q)/\partial e_q = p_s/p_q$); in the latter case the effort mix chosen by the mimicker will be undistorted.

Using the definitions of $R^i$, $\tilde{R}^i$, $\hat{R}^i$, and $\tilde{R}^i$, $i = 1, 2$ above, and Lemmas 1 and 2, we can state the optimal tax problem in the presence of two dimensions of signaling:

**Proposition 2.** In a model with two dimensions of signaling, with only an income tax in place, the optimal tax problem of the government is to choose $(y^i, c^i)$, $i = 1, 2$ in order to maximize:

$$
u^i = c^i - R^i(y^1) \tag{57}
$$
subject to the government budget constraint:

\[
\sum_i \gamma^i(y^i - c^i) = 0, \tag{58}
\]

and the IC constraints:

\[
c^2 - \tilde{R}^2(y^2) \geq c^1 - \min \left\{ \tilde{R}^2(y^1), \tilde{R}^2(y^1) \right\}, \tag{59}
\]

\[
c^1 - \tilde{R}^1(y^1) \geq c^2 - \min \left\{ \tilde{R}^1(y^2), \tilde{R}^1(y^2) \right\}. \tag{60}
\]

In Proposition 2, the expressions for \( R^i(y^i) \), \( i = 1, 2 \), are given by (48), the expression for \( \hat{R}^1(y^2) \) is given by (50), the expressions for \( \hat{R}^2(y^1) \) is given by (51), and the expression for \( \tilde{R}^1(y^2) \) is given by (54). A type-\( i \) mimicker naturally opts for the least costly choice of the possibilities in curly brackets [as reflected by the \( \min[] \) argument on the right hand side of (59) and (60)]. Notice that under both the relevant deviating strategies a type \( i \) mimicker obtains a consumption equal to \( c^j \). Hence, determining which one of the two deviating strategies dominates requires only comparing the sustained effort cost under each of the two strategies. Notice also that the IC constraint for type 2 in (59) is naturally binding in the optimum, by virtue of the strictly egalitarian preferences exhibited by the government.

A final remark is in order. If the difference \( p^1_q - p^2_q \) is sufficiently large, we have that \( \tilde{R}^2(y^1) < \hat{R}^2(y^1) \). This can be seen by considering the limiting case where \( p^1_q \to \infty \) and \( p^2_q \to 0 \), in which type-2 agents can separate themselves from type-1 agents (conditional on earning the same level of gross income \( y^1 \)) by investing heavily in the quality component and incurring arbitrarily small costs. In this scenario, type-1 workers would entail arbitrarily large costs by following the same strategy, and hence would find it unattractive. Moreover, as compared to adopting a deviating strategy that is attractive to both types of agents, type 2 agents incur a lower effort cost when they replicate the earned income of type 1 agents, but invest in signals so as to distinguish themselves from their type 1 counterparts. This observation highlights a crucial difference between the current two-signal model and the previous one-signal model. The fact that there are two signals that can be used by type-2 workers, combined with the fact that type-2 workers
have a comparative advantage (in the quality dimension) makes it possible (and under certain parametric assumptions optimal) for type-2 workers to separate themselves from their type-1 counterparts (conditional on choosing a given level of income). This could not be done with a single signal in place, as any reduction in the level of investment in the signal would be desirable for type-1 as well.

### 3.2.2 A pooling equilibrium

As an alternative to a separating equilibrium the government might try to implement a pooling equilibrium. Given that there are no exogenous public revenue needs, under a pooling equilibrium, the income tax system offers the same pre-tax income $\hat{y}$ to both types of agents, which also coincides with the net income, denoted by $\hat{c}$.

In the model with one dimension of signaling discussed in Section 2, pooling on income necessarily implied pooling on the signal. With two-dimensional signaling, instead, it is possible to have pooling on income without pooling in terms of the effort vectors chosen by the two agents. The following Proposition shows that such an equilibrium will never constitute the social optimum.

**Proposition 3.** With signaling in two dimensions, and only an income tax in place, pooling on income without pooling on the effort signals observed by firms can never constitute the social optimum.

**Proof** We begin by noting that pooling on income without pooling on the effort signals observed by firms entails no redistribution as both workers would have the same pre-tax income and would be remunerated according to the wage rates commensurate with their true ability. This implies that redistribution is carried out neither through the income channel nor through the wage channel. If the laissez-faire equilibrium is efficient, which happens when the IC constraint of type 1 agents in the laissez-faire is non-binding, pooling on income without pooling on signals would be Pareto-dominated by the laissez-faire

---

26Here we assume that the quantity price is the same for both types whereas the quality price faced by type-2 workers is lower. One could alternatively assume that both prices are lower for type-2 and satisfy: $p^n_1 = kp^n_2$, where $k > 1$ and $n = s, q$. In such a scenario, type-2 would have an absolute advantage in acquiring the signal (thereby ensuring the single crossing property, which is essential for separation). However, no comparative advantage emerges, as both types are faced with the same quality/quantity price ratio. In such a case separation (conditional on choosing a given level of income) is infeasible.
allocation. The reason is that such a pooling allocation distorts the effort/consumption bundle of at least one of the types without gaining anything on the equity side\textsuperscript{27} If, on the other hand, the IC constraint of type 1 agents is binding at the laissez-faire equilibrium, such that the effort choices of type 2 agents are distorted in the laissez-faire, it is possible that pooling on income could mitigate this distortion. However, since pooling on income without pooling on signals cannot achieve any redistribution, this efficiency gain would only benefit type 2 agents, and would hence not contribute to social welfare given our focus on the max-min social welfare function\textsuperscript{28}.

Given the result stated in Proposition\textsuperscript{3}, one can restrict attention to pooling equilibria where all agents choose the same effort vector. In this case, workers become indistinguishable from the perspective of the firm and redistribution is accomplished through the wage channel (as both workers receive a wage rate equal to the average productivity $\bar{\theta}$). However, as Proposition\textsuperscript{4} below shows, such a pooling equilibrium does not exist.

**Proposition 4.** With two dimensions of signaling and only an income tax in place, a pooling equilibrium where both workers choose the same effort vector does not exist.

**Proof** Consider a candidate pooling allocation $(\hat{y}, \hat{c})$. By virtue of Proposition\textsuperscript{3}, we can restrict attention to situations where both workers choose the same effort mix, given by the tuple $(\hat{e}_s, \hat{e}_q)$. By construction, we have that $\hat{c} = \hat{y} = \bar{\theta} h(\hat{e}_s, \hat{e}_q)$, with $\bar{\theta} \equiv \sum_i \gamma^i \bar{\theta}^i$. Let $\hat{u}^i = u^i(\hat{c}, \hat{e}_s, \hat{e}_q)$. Then, $\hat{c} - (p_s e_{is} + p_q e_{iq}) = \hat{u}^i; i = 1, 2$, will describe the indifference curves, in the $(e_s, e_q)$ plane, going through the point $(\hat{e}_s, \hat{e}_q)$ indicated by $A$ in figure 1. By virtue of our parametric assumptions, the indifference curve associated with type-2 workers is steeper than that associated with their type-1 counterparts. The intersection of the two downward sloping indifference curves creates a fork-shaped area to the north-west of point $A$ in the figure. Now consider a slight shift from point $A$ to $B$ which lies within the aforementioned fork-shaped area. By construction, point $B$ is preferred by type-2 workers to the pooling allocation (it lies

\textsuperscript{27}The argument bears similarity to the standard argument why bunching is never optimal in the two-type case with a standard Mirrleesian setup without asymmetric information between firms and workers, see e.g., Stiglitz (1982).

\textsuperscript{28}With a social welfare function that attaches a positive weight to type 2 agents, the potential efficiency gain accruing to them would have to be weighed against the distortions imposed by the pooling allocation on the choices of type 1 agents. In this case, pooling on income without pooling on the observable effort signal can be ruled out by continuity provided the weight on type 2 agents is sufficiently small.
below their indifference curve), whereas type-1 workers strictly prefer the pooling allocation $A$ over the perturbed allocation, $B$ (it lies above his indifference curve). Thus, by deviating to point $B$, type-2 workers credibly reveal their productivity to the firm and get remunerated accordingly. As $θ^2 > \bar{θ}$, it follows, by continuity, that the total output produced by a deviating type-2 worker would strictly exceed $\hat{y}$. Thus, the firm would find it profitable to hire the deviating type-2 worker. We have therefore established that the candidate pooling equilibrium is unstable.

Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 4 and the non-existence of a pooling equilibrium

An immediate corollary of Proposition 3 and 4 is that, under a pure income tax regime, the optimal solution is given by a separating equilibrium in which types 1 and 2 earn different levels of income. This represents a crucial difference between the model with signaling in two dimensions and the one-signal model considered in section 2.

Corollary 1. With two dimensions of signaling, with only an income tax in place, the social optimum is always given by a separating equilibrium.
3.3 The extended tax regime

We now extend our tax base and allow the government to tax each individual based on two observable characteristics: (i) earned income, $y$; (ii) the quantity of effort (e.g., years of education, hours physically spent at work), $e_s$. Recall that by assumption, the intensity (quality) dimension of effort $e_q$ is only observable by the firms, and hence, cannot be subject to taxation. We maintain all our earlier assumptions, and in particular, the asymmetry in information between the firms and the workers with respect to the latter’s innate productive ability. An immediate and interesting implication of allowing to tax $e_s$ is the existence of a pooling equilibrium. By conditioning the tax on both $y$ and $e_s$, the government effectively confines signaling to one dimension, implying that pooling is rendered feasible\(^{29}\).

The pooling equilibrium in the extended tax regime A government seeking to implement a pooling equilibrium in the extended tax regime chooses $(y, e_s)$ in order to maximize:

$$u^1 = y - R^1(e_s, \hat{e}_q(y, e_s)), \tag{61}$$

where $\hat{e}_q(y, e_s)$ is defined as the $e_q$ which solves $y = h(e_s, e_q)\bar{\theta}$. Notice that the equity gains of pooling crucially depend on the difference in productivities between the two types of workers whereas the efficiency properties of a pooling equilibrium crucially depend on the differences in the costs of acquiring the signal $e_q$.

The separating equilibrium in the extended tax regime Let us now turn to the separating equilibrium. The first thing to notice is that with a tax on $e_s$, the deviations associated with $\tilde{R}$ in equations (59) and (60) are rendered infeasible. For type-2 agents, the best deviating strategy will be to pool with type 1 agents, obtaining the wage rate $\bar{\theta}$. However, due to the tax on $e_s$, a type-2 mimicker is forced to replicate the quantity-signal $e_s$ of type-1 agents ($e^1_s$), making mimicking less attractive. For type-1 agents, the tax on $e_s$ implies that the only feasible deviating strategy is to replicate the effort choices of type-2 workers to separate themselves from their type-1, lower-skilled, counterparts. In the setting considered in section\(^{33}\) high-skilled workers had an absolute advantage in acquiring the (single) signal $e$.
type-2 agents. Formally, a government seeking to implement a separating equilibrium in the extended tax regime chooses \((y^i, c^i, e^i_s), i = 1, 2\) in order to maximize:

\[
u^1 = c^1 - R^1(e^1_s, e^1_q)
\]

subject to the government budget constraint:

\[
\sum_i (y^i - c^i) \gamma_i = 0,
\]

and the incentive constraints

\[
c^2 - R^2(e^2_s, e^2_q) \geq c^1 - R^2(e^1_s, e^2_q)
\]

\[
c^1 - R^1(e^1_s, e^1_q) \geq c^2 - R^2(e^2_s, e^2_q)
\]

where

\[
e^2_q \text{ is the solution to } y^1 = h(e^1_s, e^2_q)\bar{\theta}
\]

\[
e^i_q \text{ is the solution to } y^i = h(e^i_s, e^i_q)\theta^i, i = 1, 2.
\]

The incentive constraint (64) and equation (66) reflect that, for type-2 mimickers, the optimal deviating strategy is the off-equilibrium deviation where they pool with type-1 agents at the income level \(y^1\). This is a feasible strategy since the effort vector \((e^1_s, e^2_q)\) would certainly be attractive to type-1 agents due to the fact that, since \(\bar{\theta} > \theta^1, \hat{e}^2_q < e^1_q\).

The incentive constraint (65) reflects that the only feasible deviating strategy for type-1 mimickers is for them to earn \(y^2\) by replicating the optimal effort level \(e^2_q\) of type-2 agents (given that \(e_s\) is observable by the government).

**The social optimum** The problem solved by a max-min government is to maximize the well being of type-1 workers. In the presence of a tax on the quantity-signal \(e_s\), this is done by implementing either the optimal separating or the optimal pooling equilibrium, depending on which equilibrium configuration yields the highest utility to type-1 agents. We thus have the following:
Proposition 5. In the model with two dimensions of signaling, under the extended tax regime, the social optimum can be either a separating or a pooling equilibrium.

A formal proof is skipped for brevity purposes, as the problem solved in the presence of a tax on \( e_s \) is similar to the government’s problem under a pure income tax regime and with a single dimension of signaling (i.e., the problem discussed in Section 2.2).

Once again notice that, by implementing a pooling equilibrium, the government forces wage equalization and thereby eliminates all the information rent (derived by high-skilled agents) associated with the difference in productivities (but not the information rent associated with the difference in the acquisition costs of the signal). However, whether or not a pooling equilibrium represents the social optimum will also depend on a comparison between the efficiency properties of the two types of equilibria.

With respect to the efficiency properties of an optimal pooling equilibrium, notice that the first order conditions of the government’s problem can be written:

\[
1 - p_q^1 \frac{\partial \hat{e}_q}{\partial y} = 0, \tag{68}
\]

\[
-p_s + p_q^1 \frac{\partial h(e_s, \hat{e}_q)}{\partial e_s} \frac{\partial h(e_s, \hat{e}_q)}{\partial e_q} = 0. \tag{69}
\]

Eq. (69) shows that, at the optimal pooling equilibrium, type-1 agents choose an undistorted effort mix. Given that \( p_q^1 > p_q^2 \), eq. (69) also implies that at the optimal pooling equilibrium, type-2 agents are forced to choose a distorted effort mix, with \( e_q^2 = \hat{e}_q \) being distorted downwards.\[30\] Instead, as we show in the supplementary material, at an optimal separating equilibrium the following conditions hold:

\[
p_s - p_q^1 \frac{\partial h(e_s^1, e_q)}{\partial e_s} \leq 0, \tag{70}
\]

\[
p_s - p_q^2 \frac{\partial h(e_s^2, e_q)}{\partial e_s} \geq 0. \tag{71}
\]

\[30\] Notice that eq. (68) can also be equivalently rewritten as \( 1 - \frac{p_q^1}{\theta} \frac{\partial h(e_s, \hat{e}_q)}{\partial e_q} = 0 \). Since an undistorted level of income would satisfy the condition \( 1 - \frac{p_q^1}{\theta} \frac{\partial h(e_s, \hat{e}_q)}{\partial e_q} = 0 \) for type-1 agents and \( 1 - \frac{p_q^2}{\theta} \frac{\partial h(e_s, \hat{e}_q)}{\partial e_q} = 0 \) for type-2 agents, it also follows that at the optimal pooling equilibrium \( y \) is distorted upwards for type-1 agents and downwards for type-2 agents.
According to inequality (70), the effort mix chosen by type-1 agents is distorted towards $e_s$, whereas according to (71) the effort mix chosen by type-2 agents is either left undistorted (which happens when the constraint (65) is slack) or is distorted towards $e_q$ (when the constraint (65) is binding). Keeping in mind that type-2 agents have a comparative advantage in the effort/signal $e_q$ (and, therefore, type-1 agents have a comparative advantage in the effort/signal $e_s$), this pattern of distortions is coherent with the goal of relaxing the binding IC constraints. Given that constraint (64) is necessarily binding under a max-min objective, distorting the effort mix of type-1 agents towards the component $e_s$ is instrumental in discouraging mimicking by type-2 agents. Conversely, distorting the effort mix of type-2 agents towards the component $e_q$ is instrumental in discouraging mimicking by type-1 agents. However, given that constraint (65) may either be binding or not, distorting the effort mix of type-2 agents is only warranted when mimicking by type-1 agents is a relevant threat.\footnote{In the supplementary material we also show that an optimal separating equilibrium satisfies the conditions $1 - \frac{\mu_1}{\theta \partial h(e_1^*, e_2^*)/\partial e_q} > 0$ and $1 - \frac{\mu_2}{\theta \partial h(e_1^*, e_2^*)/\partial e_q} \leq 0$. The first inequality states that the income earned by type-1 agents, i.e. $y^1$, is distorted downwards (to deter mimicking by type-2 agents). The second inequality states that the income earned by type-2 agents, i.e. $y^2$, is either left undistorted (when the constraint (65) is slack) or is distorted upwards (when the constraint (65) is binding).}

Two final remarks are in order. First, we would like to emphasize a crucial difference between Proposition 5 and Proposition 1. The latter, which we presented in section 2, showed that in the extended tax regime, when signaling is confined to one dimension, the optimum is always given by a separating equilibrium. Proposition 5 shows, in contrast, that when signaling is carried out along two dimensions, the optimum in the extended tax regime can be either a separating or a pooling equilibrium. The reason for this difference is that, when there are multiple signals, the information rents associated with the difference in productivities are not fully eliminated under the separating equilibrium in the extended tax regime. Second, it is useful to briefly discuss what would happen in a model with more than two signals. In the more general case, if the tax liability cannot be conditioned on the entire set of signals, taxing the signals can only mitigate the information rent stemming from differences in productivities. Then, one might be tempted to argue that the implementation of a pooling equilibrium might be socially desirable based on equity considerations. Furthermore, one might also be tempted
to argue that the case for implementing a pooling equilibrium becomes stronger the smaller the set of signals on which the tax liability is conditioned. The problem with this reasoning is that it overlooks the fact that a pooling equilibrium must necessarily be sustainable in order to be implementable. In general, denoting by $n$ the cardinality of the set of signals, pooling will be sustainable either when the (minimum) number of taxed signals is $n - 1$, or when it is $n - j$ (with $1 < j < n$) and the high-skilled individuals have no comparative advantage within the set of signals unobserved (and therefore untaxed) by the government.

4 An illustrative example

In this section, we make a functional form assumption that allows us to shed more light on the IC constraints that are relevant in the bi-dimensional signaling case when the government aims at implementing a separating equilibrium. In particular, we assume:

$$h(e_s, e_q) = (e_s e_q)^\beta A,$$

where $A$ is a positive constant and $0 < \beta < 1/2$. Assumption (72) will also be used to provide a numerical example of the results delivered by our model.

4.1 (In)efficiency of the laissez-faire

Consider what would be an efficient laissez-faire outcome if agents were remunerated based on their true productivities. A type $i$ agent would then solve:

$$\max_{e_q, e_s} \left\{ (e_q e_s)^\beta A \theta^i - p_s e_s - p_q^i e_q \right\}.$$  

Denoting by $e_q^i$ and $e_s^i$ the optimal value for the choice variables, from the first order conditions of the problem above one would get that

$$e_q^i = (p_s)^{-\frac{\beta}{1-2\beta}} \left( p_q^i \right)^{\frac{(\beta-1)}{1-2\beta}} \left( \beta A \theta^i \right)^{\frac{1}{1-2\beta}},$$  

$$e_s^i = (p_s)^{-\frac{1-\beta}{1-2\beta}} \left( p_q^i \right)^{-\frac{\beta}{1-2\beta}} \left( \beta A \theta^i \right)^{\frac{1}{1-2\beta}},$$
implying that

\[ U^i = \left(p_s p_q^i\right)^{-\frac{\beta}{1-2\beta}} \left(A\theta^i\right)^{\frac{1}{1-2\beta}} \beta^{\frac{2\beta}{1-2\beta}} \left(1 - 2\beta\right). \]

(76)

However, to assess whether or not the laissez-faire equilibrium will indeed fulfil the efficiency conditions (74)-(75), we need to take a closer look at the incentives faced by type-1 agents. In particular, we need to check that type-1 agents would not be better off by replicating the effort choices made by type-2 agents in order to get remunerated according to the productivity of their higher-skilled counterparts. By behaving as mimickers, type-1 agents would obtain a utility given by:

\[ \hat{U}^1 = (e^2 q e^2 s) \beta A\theta^2 - p_s e^2 s - p^1 q e^2. \]

(77)

Substituting for \(e^2 q\) and \(e^2 s\) in (77), the values provided, for \(i = 2\), by (74)-(75) gives:

\[ \hat{U}^1 = \left(p_s p_q^2\right)^{-\frac{\beta}{1-2\beta}} \left(A\theta^2\right)^{\frac{1}{1-2\beta}} \beta^{\frac{2\beta}{1-2\beta}} - \left(p_s\right)^{-\frac{\beta}{1-2\beta}} \left(p_q^2\right)^{-\frac{1-\beta}{1-2\beta}} \left(\beta A\theta^2\right)^{\frac{1}{1-2\beta}}. \]

(78)

Thus, a type-1 agent will have no incentive to mimic a type 2 agent, and the laissez-faire equilibrium will be efficient, provided that \(U^1 \geq \hat{U}^1\), an inequality that can be rewritten (using (76), for \(i = 1\), and (78)) as

\[ \left(\theta^1 / \theta^2\right)^{\frac{1}{1-2\beta}} \geq \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - 2\beta} \left(p^1 q / p^2 q\right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-2\beta}}. \]

(79)

A sufficient condition for (79) to be satisfied is that \(1 - \beta - \left(p^1 q / p^2 q\right) \beta \leq 0\), i.e. \(p^1 q / p^2 q \geq (1 - \beta) / \beta\), highlighting that efficiency under laissez-faire requires that the difference in the cost of acquiring the quality signal is sufficiently large.

### 4.2 The income tax regime

Exploiting assumption (72) allows us to obtain closed-form expressions for the incentive constraints (59)-(60). To achieve this goal, we begin by deriving the effort cost sustained by agents who choose the point on the income tax schedule intended for them.
Choices of a truthfully reporting agent

Consider a type $i$ agent who earns the income level $y^i$ intended for him/her by the government. He/she will choose an efficient mix of $e_s$ and $e_q$ by solving the following minimization problem:

$$\min_{e_s, e_q} p_s e_s + p_q e_q \quad \text{subject to} \quad (e_s e_q)^{\beta} A^{\theta^i} = y^i. \quad (80)$$

The optimal effort-choices are given by

$$e_s^i(y^i) = \sqrt{\left( \frac{y^i}{A^{\theta^i}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \frac{p_q}{p_s}} \quad \text{and} \quad e_q^i(y^i) = \sqrt{\left( \frac{y^i}{A^{\theta^i}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \frac{p_s}{p_q}} \quad (81)$$

Insertion of $(81)$ into the cost function yields:

$$R^i(y^i) = p_s \sqrt{\left( \frac{y^i}{A^{\theta^i}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \frac{p_q}{p_s}} + p_q \sqrt{\left( \frac{y^i}{A^{\theta^i}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \frac{p_s}{p_q}} = 2 \sqrt{\left( \frac{y^i}{A^{\theta^i}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} p_s p_q^{\frac{1}{\beta}}}, \quad i = 1, 2. \quad (82)$$

Optimal deviating strategies

There are three cases that need to be distinguished in order to determine which of the deviating strategies embedded in the incentive constraints (59)–(60) are relevant. These cases can be distinguished using conditions that depend on the ratio $\theta^2/\theta^1$, the relative size of the two groups ($\gamma^1$ and $\gamma^2$), and a constant defined as:

$$\Omega \equiv \left[ \left( p_q^2 + p_1^2 \right) / \left( 2 \sqrt{p_q p_1} \right) \right]^{2\beta}. \quad (83)$$

Case 1: $\theta^2/\theta^1 \leq \Omega$ In this case we have that, in the constraint (59), $\min \left\{ \tilde{R}^2(y^1), \tilde{R}^2(y^2) \right\} = \tilde{R}^2(y^1)$, and in the constraint (60) we have that $\min \left\{ \tilde{R}^1(y^2), \tilde{R}^1(y^2) \right\} = \tilde{R}^1(y^2)$. Moreover, the effort mix chosen by a type-$i$ mimicker under his/her optimal deviating strategy is undistorted (i.e., it satisfies the condition $e_q/e_s = p_s/p_q$), and we have $\tilde{R}^2(y^1) = 2 \sqrt{\left( y^1 / (A\theta^2) \right)^{1/2} p_q^2 p_s}$ and $\tilde{R}^1(y^2) = 2 \sqrt{\left( y^2 / (A\theta^1) \right)^{1/2} p_q^1 p_s}$. Thus, the relevant downward IC constraint can be expressed as:

$$c^2 - R^2(y^2) \geq c^1 - 2 \sqrt{\left[ y^1 / (A\theta^2) \right]^{1/2} p_q^2 p_s}, \quad (84)$$

32 In our numerical example, we will vary parameters in such a way that all three cases are considered. The derivations needed to distinguish between the different cases are available upon request.
and the relevant \textit{upward} IC-constraint can be expressed as:

\[
c^1 - R^1(y^1) \geq c^2 - 2 \sqrt{[y^2/(A\theta^1)]^{1/\beta} p_q^1 p_s}.
\] (85)

\textbf{Case 2: } $\mathbf{\gamma^1 + (\theta^2/\theta^1) \gamma^2 < \Omega < \theta^2/\theta^1}$ In this case we have again that, in the constraint (59), $\min \{ \tilde{R}^2(y^1), \hat{R}^2(y^1) \} = \tilde{R}^2(y^1)$. This time, however, a type-2 mimicker needs to select a distorted effort mix ($e_q/e_s \neq p_s/p_q^2$) in order to achieve separation and be paid according to his/her true productivity. For the constraint (60) we have instead that $\min \{ \tilde{R}^1(y^2), \tilde{R}^1(y^2) \} = \tilde{R}^1(y^2)$. Thus, the relevant \textit{downward} IC constraint can be formulated as:

\[
c^2 - R^2(y^2) \geq c^1 - \sqrt{p_s p_q^1} \frac{\sqrt{(y^1/A)^{1/\beta}} (1/\theta^2)^{1/\beta}}{\sqrt{(1/\theta^1)^{1/\beta} + \sqrt{(1/\theta^1)^{1/\beta} - (1/\theta^2)^{1/\beta}} - p_q^2 \sqrt{p_s / p_q^1} \sqrt{(y^1/A)^{1/\beta}} \left[ \sqrt{(1/\theta^1)^{1/\beta} + \sqrt{(1/\theta^1)^{1/\beta} - (1/\theta^2)^{1/\beta}} \right]},
\] (86)

and the relevant \textit{upward} IC constraint as:

\[
c^1 - R^1(y^1) \geq c^2 - \sqrt{[y^2/(A\theta^2)]^{1/\beta} p_s / p_q^2 (p_q^2 + p_q^1)}.
\] (87)

\textbf{Case 3: } $\mathbf{\gamma^1 + (\theta^2/\theta^1) \gamma^2 \geq \Omega}$ In this case it is not possible to unambiguously determine whether, in the constraint (59), $\tilde{R}^2(y^1) \lt \hat{R}^2(y^1)$ or vice versa. What can be established is that the mimicking strategy with associated cost $\tilde{R}^2(y^1)$ necessarily requires that a type-2 mimicker selects a distorted effort mix. Thus, there will be two relevant \textit{downward} IC constraints, one provided by (86) (the one associated with cost $\tilde{R}^2(y^1)$), and the other (associated with the cost $\hat{R}^2(y^1)$) given by:

\[
c^2 - R^2(y^2) \geq c^1 - 2 \sqrt{(y^1/A\theta)^{1/\beta}} p_s p_q^2.
\] (88)

For the constraint (60) we have again that $\min \{ \tilde{R}^1(y^2), \tilde{R}^1(y^2) \} = \tilde{R}^1(y^2)$. Once more, therefore, the relevant \textit{upward} constraint is given by (87).
4.3 Government problem, extended tax regime

In the extended tax regime, obtaining closed form solutions to the incentive constraints using the functional form assumption in (72) is more straightforward. We begin with the separating equilibrium. In this case, equations (66) and (67) take the form:

\[ e^*_i = \left( \frac{y^i}{A\theta^i} \right)^{1/\beta} \frac{1}{e^s_i}, (i = 1, 2) \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{e}_q = \left( \frac{y^1}{A\theta} \right)^{1/\beta} \frac{1}{e^1_s}. \]  

Thus, the incentive constraints (64)-(65) can be written as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
    c^1 - p^1_s e^1_s - \left( \frac{y^1}{A\theta^1} \right)^{1/\beta} \frac{p^1_q}{e^1_s} & \geq c^2 - p^1_s e^2_s - \left( \frac{y^2}{A\theta^2} \right)^{1/\beta} \frac{p^1_q}{e^2_s}, \\
    c^2 - p^2_s e^2_s - \left( \frac{y^2}{A\theta^2} \right)^{1/\beta} \frac{p^2_q}{e^2_s} & \geq c^1 - p^2_s e^1_s - \left( \frac{y^1}{A\theta} \right)^{1/\beta} \frac{p^2_q}{e^1_s}.
\end{align*}
\]

When implementing a pooling equilibrium incentive constraints can be neglected and, in accordance with (61), the government chooses \((y, e_s)\) to maximize

\[ u^1 = y - p^1_s e_s + p^1_q \hat{e}_q(y, e_s), \]  

where \(\hat{e}_q(e_s, y)\) is the value of \(e_q\) which solves the equation \(y = (e_s e_q)^\beta A\theta^i\).

4.4 Numerical results

We fix the productivity of type 2 to \(\theta^2 = 100\) and compute the social welfare level, distortions, and income levels in the various tax regimes when \(\theta^1\) varies between 1 and 100. In this way, we consider a wide range of values for the ratio \(\theta^1/\theta^2\). We maintain our previous normalization \(p^1_s = p^2_s = p^2_q = 1\) and set \(\beta = 0.25, A = 1\). We consider two scenarios regarding the difference in the cost of acquiring \(e_q\) between the two types of agents. In the first scenario, we consider a small value of \(p^1_q - p^2_q\), letting \(p^1_q = 1.05\). In the second scenario we consider a large value of \(p^1_q - p^2_q\), letting \(p^1_q = 1.5\).\footnote{The qualitative features of the results are robust to changes in \(p^1_q\) and \(\beta\).}

Since our model is quite stylized, we refrain from making a precise empirical calibration. However, in principle one could interpret \(\theta^2 - \theta^1\) as the difference in labor

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productivity between college and non-college educated workers. This would suggest that values of $\theta^1$ between 66 and 85 would be realistic given that studies have found college wage premiums that range between 18 and 50 per cent\footnote{See e.g. \citet{vanDerVelden2016} who use recent data from 22 OECD countries and find that the college wage premium ranges between 18 percent (Sweden) and 50 per cent (Slovak Republic). \citet{Ashworth2019} find that the college wage premium in the US ranges between 40 and 50 per cent depending on cohort and data set used. The numbers in the text are based on the calculation $100/85 \approx 1.1765$ and $100/66 \approx 1.5152$.}. Regarding $p^1_q - p^2_q$, this could represent differences in the costs of acquiring education depending on parental background (capturing, for example, whether the parents are college-educated or not).

In our simulations, we report the maximum achievable welfare gain. This maximum welfare gain is computed at the value of $\theta^1$ where the difference between the social welfare level in the extended regime and the social welfare level in the income tax regime is the largest, and we focus on an equivalent-variation type of welfare measure\footnote{The equivalent-variation type welfare gain is obtained by first calculating the wage level $\theta^1$ at which the vertical distance between the social welfare levels of the extended tax regime and the income tax regime is the largest. We then compute the minimal amount of resources that must be injected into the income tax regime in order to reach the social welfare level of the extended tax regime (repeatedly solving the government optimization program). Finally, we divide this number by the aggregate output of the income tax regime to get a welfare gain measure expressed as a fraction of output.}.

Figure 2 shows the results for the case when the difference $p^1_q - p^2_q$ is small. As expected, we see from the top left panel, that the extended tax regime always welfare-dominates the income tax regime. More interestingly, we see that the it is optimal to
implement a separating allocation when $\theta^1$ takes on low and intermediate values, whereas the pooling allocation dominates when $\theta^1$ is relatively close to $\theta^2$\textsuperscript{36}. The maximum welfare gain of taxing the signal is obtained at $\theta^1 = 84.1$, amounts to 6.31% of aggregate output, and is associated with the implementation of a pooling allocation.

Turning to the top right panel of figure 2, we see that the income tax regime and the extended separating regime always imply a positive marginal tax rate on low-skilled agents. This is a standard property in optimal income tax models and serves to mitigate the binding downwards IC constraint. The negative marginal tax rate is non-standard and is due the binding upwards incentive constraint. It can also be noted that the earned income distortions in the separating extended regime are more pronounced than in the income tax regime. In the extended pooling regime, a positive marginal tax rate is levied on high-skill agents and a negative marginal tax rate is levied on low-skill agents. This is due to the cross-subsidization between the two types in the pooling allocation. Moreover, since the degree of cross-subsidization decreases when $\theta^1$ approaches $\theta^2$, the marginal tax rates converge when $\theta^1$ approaches $\theta^2$.

The bottom-left panel shows the income levels in the different optimal tax regimes. Not surprisingly, the income levels associated with the pooling regime lie in between the income levels of the tax regimes where the labor market equilibrium is separating. Moreover, the income levels of the two agents converge as the two agents become more similar in terms of $\theta$.

Finally, we turn to the bottom-right panel. Notice that, in this panel, we are only representing the graphs of the extended tax regime. The reason is that, by construction, the mix of effort inputs is always undistorted with only an income tax in place. In the separating extended tax regime, we note that it is always desirable to subsidize the observable dimension of education effort $e_s$ of type 1 agents (reflected in an upwards-distortion). The reason is that subsidizing the dimension of education effort in which the low-skill agent has a comparative advantage, mitigates the incentive constraint of the high-skill type. For the high-skill type, it is desirable to tax $e_s$ over the range of values of $\theta^1$ for which the upwards incentive constraint is binding. This can be understood

\textsuperscript{36}Notice that when $\theta^1$ is very close to 100, the separating allocation dominates, even though it is not visible in the figure. This is a knife-edge case of no practical relevance.
from the fact that by taxing the quantity dimension, we are implicitly subsidizing the quality dimension in which the high-skill type has a comparative advantage. This serves to mitigate the binding incentive constraint of the low-skill type. In the pooling regime, there is by definition no binding incentive constraint. As we are invoking a Rawlsian welfare function, the optimum is simply to achieve the best effort mix from the perspective of the low skilled type. This implies an efficient effort mix for the low skilled type and, hence, an upwards distortion for the high skilled types, due to their comparative advantage in the quality dimension of effort.

The numerical example illustrates that both education subsidies and taxes are warranted on redistributive grounds to mitigate binding IC constraints. Notably, and contrary to conventional wisdom, a tax on education is shown to be desirable. It serves to implement a separating allocation, via mitigating the incentives of the low-skilled workers to mimic their higher-skilled counterparts, when employers are unable to observe the true productivity of their employees.

Figure 3 shows the results for the case when the difference $p^1_q - p^2_q$ is relatively large. Again, as expected, the extended tax regime always welfare-dominates the income tax regime. However, in contrast to the case when $p^1_q - p^2_q$ is relatively small, we can see that pooling is always suboptimal. This reflects the fact that, as the difference in the costs of acquiring the signals becomes larger and larger, it becomes less likely that an optimal separating equilibrium features a double distortion with both a downward and an upward binding IC constraint. In particular, when the difference in the costs of acquiring the signals is sufficiently large, the optimal separating equilibrium will preserve efficiency at the top (and only entail a distortion on the behavior of low-skilled agents). In Figure 3 this is shown by the fact that both in the top-right- and bottom-right panel, the black dashed line coincides with the horizontal axis (in contrast to what happens in Figure 2). The maximum welfare gain of taxing the signal is obtained at $\theta^1 = 71.0$, amounts to 1.20% of aggregate output, and is associated with a separating allocation.

As we highlighted in Section 3.3 where we compared the relative merits of pooling versus separating equilibria, the attractiveness of implementing a pooling equilibrium hinges on its equity gains, i.e. the fact that it fully eliminates all the information
rent (derived by high-skilled agents) associated with the difference in productivities. Obviously, this gain is bigger the larger the information rent, associated with differences in productivities, that is enjoyed by high-skilled agents under an optimal separating equilibrium. On the other hand, whether this equity gain of pooling can be reaped cheaply or not (in efficiency terms), depends on the magnitude of the difference in the costs of acquiring the signals (in our case, the magnitude of the difference \( p_1 q - p_2 q \)). This is due to the fact that an optimal pooling equilibrium always violates efficiency at the top. Instead, an optimal separating equilibrium preserves efficiency at the top when the difference \( p_1 q - p_2 q \) is sufficiently large.

5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks

We have analyzed optimal redistribution in the presence of signaling, introducing two realistic new features to the standard Mirrleesian framework: (i) a second layer of asymmetric information between employers and workers regarding the productive capacity of workers, with the latter having the possibility of engaging in signaling to credibly convey this information to prospective employers; (ii) the possibility to levy a direct tax on the signals acquired by workers (in addition to taxing income). The combination of the two new features maintains the second-best nature of the government optimization problem,
and the inherent trade-off between conflicting equity and efficiency considerations. For tractability, we have focused on a two-type model with high- and low-ability agents; regarding the dimension of signaling, we have considered both a setting with unidimensional signaling and a setting with bi-dimensional signaling. To ensure the possibility that agents credibly signal their true type to prospective employers, we have assumed that low- and high-skilled agents also differ in the cost of acquiring the signal(s).

The presence of asymmetric information between employees and firms implies that the government can influence the labor market equilibrium, implementing either a separating or a pooling equilibrium. It also implies that the IC constraints faced by the government are non-standard. In particular, agents of a given type \( i \) often have more than one deviating strategy that allow them to earn the income level intended by the government for agents of type \( j \neq i \). Depending on the deviating strategy that is adopted, mimickers may end up being remunerated by firms according to their true productivity, the average productivity, or the productivity of the type that they mimic. By supplementing income taxation with a tax on the signal(s), the government succeeds in shrinking the set of deviating strategies that are available to agents, thereby mitigating (or fully eliminating) the information rents associated with the differences in productivities between workers. This may lead either to extracting a higher fiscal surplus from the high skilled, and therefore enhanced redistribution via the income channel, or to a change in the wage structure, inducing cross-subsidization between skill levels\(^{37}\).

We have shown that, when signaling is confined to a single dimension, and the only policy instrument is a nonlinear income tax, the social optimum may either be a separating- or a pooling equilibrium. The desirability of a pooling equilibrium derives from the role played by policy-induced wage compression in realizing redistributive goals. A pooling equilibrium forces wage equalization; therefore, it eliminates all the information rent (derived by high-skilled agents) associated with the difference in productivities (but not the information rent associated with the difference in the costs of acquiring the signal). However, whether or not a pooling equilibrium constitutes the social optimum will also depend on a comparison between the efficiency properties of

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\(^{37}\)With more than two types, a combination of both could be desirable.
the two types of equilibria.\textsuperscript{38}

With unidimensional signaling, supplementing the income tax with a direct tax levied on the signal implies that a pooling equilibrium is no longer necessary to fully eliminate the information rent associated with differences in productivities. In this case, the social optimum is always given by a separating equilibrium. A pooling equilibrium is suboptimal because its main advantage, from an equity point of view, is the elimination of the information rent associated with differences in productivities. However, this equity gain can more efficiently be obtained by taxing the signals and implementing a separating equilibrium. With bi-dimensional signaling, with only an income tax in place, there cannot be any redistribution though wage compression given that a pooling equilibrium fails to exist. Moreover, in contrast to what happens in the setting with unidimensional signaling, supplementing the income tax with a tax on the signal that is observed by the government is not enough to fully eliminate, under a separating equilibrium, the information rent associated with differences in productivities. However, by eliminating the possibility for firms to cream-skim, an extended tax regime can support a pooling equilibrium and, thereby, achieve redistribution through wage compression.

The above remarks highlight a crucial difference between the cases of unidimensional- and bidimensional signaling. In the former, taxing the signal observed by the government allows to fully eliminate the information rent associated with differences in productivities; in the latter, this information rent is only partially mitigated (unless a pooling equilibrium is implemented).\textsuperscript{39}

From a policy perspective, our analysis calls for revisiting commonly applied policy tools often warranted on efficiency grounds to address market failures, such as education mandates. We argue that these instruments effectively constitute forms of direct taxes levied on signals, viewing educational attainment as signaling devices used by high-skilled workers to separate themselves in the labor market. Our analysis alludes,

\textsuperscript{38}A necessary condition for a pooling equilibrium to represent the social optimum is that the information rent associated with the differences in productivities cannot be fully eliminated by implementing a separating equilibrium. The larger this information rent, the more likely it is that a separating equilibrium will feature a double distortion with both a downward- and an upward binding IC constraint. Given that at a pooling equilibrium both high- and low-skilled agents face a distortion, when the same happens at a separating equilibrium, the efficiency properties of the two equilibria become more similar.

\textsuperscript{39}See also the related discussion about the case of more than two signals in Section 3.3.
therefore, to the potentially significant role played by such policy tools in realizing redistributive goals as a supplement to income taxation.

There are several possible extensions to our analysis. We have considered models with two types of agents, distinguishing between separating equilibria and equilibria with full wage compression. With more than two types, bunching of types would be possible implying partial wage compression, an issue we have only lightly touched upon in Section 2. Another possibility would be to combine signaling and screening in the same model, which potentially could introduce interesting interactions between these two elements of information transmission in the labor market. We leave these interesting questions as topics for future research.

References


