2019

CEO Incentives Shown to Yield Positive Societal Benefits

Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, August 26, 2019

Författare: Lars Oxelheim

The negative aspects of large CEO pay and the associated incentives have been a hot political issue in many countries. Our research identifies some positive aspects of CEO incentives in a broader economic/societal context that have been overlooked. In a five-year longitudinal study across major free-market nations in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, we find when a higher proportion of CEOs in a nation receive incentives, that nation’s GDP increases significantly in the following years, independent of the incentives monetary value.​

Artikeln online (behörighet kan krävas)


Referens:

Oxelheim, Lars (2019), "CEO Incentives Shown to Yield Positive Societal Benefits". Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 26 augusti.

Lars Oxelheim

Kontakt

Tel: 08 665 4527
Mobil: 070 861 9361
lars.oxelheim@ifn.se

Aktuell forskare

Gabriel Heller Sahlgren Ph.D.

Ämnesområden: Hälsa, privatiseringar, skattefinansierade tjänster, utbildning

Några av de frågor Gabriel Heller Sahlgren försöker besvara i sin forskning:

  • Vad krävs för att skolmarknader ska fungera?
  • Hur reagerar aktörer inom skolväsendet på ekonomiska incitament?
  • Skillnader mellan vinstdrivande och icke-vinstdrivande skolor.

 

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