Does control of patronage jobs significantly increase a political party’s chances of winning elections in U.S. states? We employ a differences-in-differences design, exploiting the considerable variation in the dates that different states adopted civil service reforms. Our evidence suggests that political parties in U.S. states were able to use state-level patronage to increase the probability of maintaining control of state legislatures and statewide elective offices. We also find that an “entrenched” party, in power for a longer time, can use patronage more effectively. We consider several alternative hypotheses that might plausibly account for the patterns in the data, but find no evidence to support them.
Referens:
Folke, Olle, Shigeo Hirano och James M. Snyder Jr. (2011),
"Patronage and Elections in U.S. States".
American Political Science Review
105(3),
567–585.