Elections and Reform: The Adoption of Civil Service Systems in the U.S. States

Särtryck nr 2013:32

Författare: Michael M. Ting, James M. Snyder, Jr, Shigeo Hirano och Olle FolkeÅr: 2013 Publikation: Journal of Theoretical Politics Årgång (nr): 25 (3) Sidor: 363–387
Artikeln online (behörighet kan krävas)

Most government bureaucracies in developed countries use civil service systems. What accounts for their adoption? We develop and test a model of bureaucratic reforms under repeated partisan competition. In the model, two political parties composed of overlapping generations of candidates compete for office. Under a spoils system, an incumbent politician can either continue to “politicize” the bureaucracy, which allows her to direct benefits to voters in a way that will increase her electoral prospects, or she can “insulate” the bureaucracy, which prevents all future winners from using the bureaucracy for electoral advantage. Our main result is that politicization persists when incumbents expect to win, and insulation takes place when they expect to lose. We test this hypothesis using data from the adoption of civil service reforms across the U.S. states. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical patterns leading up to the implementation of the general civil service reforms. Using both state and city level data, we observe an increase in partisan competition prior to the reforms.

Ting, Michael M., James M. Snyder, Jr, Shigeo Hirano och Olle Folke (2013), "Elections and Reform: The Adoption of Civil Service Systems in the U.S. States". Journal of Theoretical Politics 25(3), 363–387.

Aktuell forskare

Pär Holmberg, docent.

Ämnesområden: Auktioner, elmarknad, energi, spelteori

Några av de frågor Pär Holmberg försöker besvara i sin forskning:

  • Hur ser elproducenternas budgivning ut på elmarknaden?
  • Hur påverkas budgivningen av marknadsregler, information, ställtider och flaskhalsar i elnätet? 


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