Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Särtryck nr 2014:22

Författare: Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton och Jörgen W. WeibullÅr: 2014 Publikation: Games and Economic Behavior Årgång (nr): 85 (May) Sidor: 272–288
Artikeln online (behörighet kan krävas)
Preliminär version

We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.

Andersson, Ola, Cédric Argenton och Jörgen W. Weibull (2014), "Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty". Games and Economic Behavior 85(May), 272–288.

Ola Andersson


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