2017

Design of Reforms with Time-Inconsistent Voters

Särtryck nr 2017:73

Författare: Jisoo Hwang och Johanna MöllerströmÅr: 2017 Publikation: Journal of Public Economic Theory Årgång (nr): 19 (3) Sidor: 748–761
Artikeln online (behörighet kan krävas)


Widespread agreement that a political reform is necessary is no guarantee that it is actually undertaken in a timely manner. There is often a delay before action is taken and reform packages that would be most efficient to implement all at once are often done only gradually. We propose a theoretical model explaining this behavior and show that when voters have present-biased, time-inconsistent preferences, gradualism can arise in equilibrium and be welfare-enhancing. This is because without the possibility for gradualism, time-inconsistent voters would delay implementing the reform even more. Using a citizen candidate model, we allow the agenda setter, who decides which reform schedule to put to vote, to be endogenously determined. We show that voters who are aware of their own time inconsistency can use the election of the agenda setter as a commitment device and appoint an agent who is more patient than the median voter in order to avoid full procrastination and to achieve efficiency-maximizing gradualism.


Referens:
Hwang, Jisoo och Johanna Möllerström (2017), "Design of Reforms with Time-Inconsistent Voters". Journal of Public Economic Theory 19(3), 748–761.

Aktuell forskare

Niclas Berggren docent, programchef

Ämnesområden:

Institutionell ekonomi, politisk ekonomi och politiskt beteende.

Några av de frågor Niclas Berggren försöker besvara i sin forskning:

- Hur påverkar sociala variabler (som tillit, tolerans och religion) ekonomins funktionssätt?

- Finns det ett samband mellan graden av marknadsekonomi och sociala variabler ( som tillit och tolerans)?

- Vilken roll spelar skönhet för politikers valframgångar?

 

IFN kalendarium

Institutet för Näringslivsforskning, Grevgatan 34 - 2 tr, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden | Tel: +46-(0)8-665 45 00 | info@ifn.se