2006–2010

Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance

Särtryck nr 2006:28

Författare: Assar Lindbeck och Sten NybergÅr: 2006 Publikation: Quarterly Journal of Economics Årgång (nr): 121 (4) Sidor: 1473–1503


Empirically, disincentive effects on work of generous welfare state arrangements tend to appear with a substantial time lag. One explanation is that norms concerning work and benefit dependency delay such effects. We model altruistic parents' economic incentives for instilling such work norms in their children. Anticipated economic support from parents may reduce work effort, and parental altruism makes threats to withdraw such support noncredible. Instilling norms mitigates this problem. However, generous social insurance arrangements tend to weaken parents' incentives to instill such norms in their children. We find empirical support for this prediction.


Referens:
Lindbeck, Assar och Sten Nyberg (2006), "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance". Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(4), 1473–1503.

Assar Lindbeck

Kontakt

Tel: 08 665 4558
assar.lindbeck@ifn.se

Aktuell forskare

Lars Persson

Ämnesområden: digitalisering, entreprenörskap, industriell ekonomi, internationella investeringar, konkurrenspolitik, riskkapital etc

Några frågor som Lars Persson försöker besvara i sin forskning:

  • Vilka effekter har en mer protektionistisk syn på utländskt företagsägande effektiviteten på den inhemska strukturomvandlingen?

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