This paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from Peters and Severinov [Peters, M., Severinov, S., 2006. Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of Economic Theory 130, 220–245]. The investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions, and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts.
Economics Letters
An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions
Tidskriftsartikel
Referens
Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson och Fredrik Andersson (2012). ”An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions”. Economics Letters 116(1), 99–101. doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.023
Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson och Fredrik Andersson (2012). ”An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions”. Economics Letters 116(1), 99–101. doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.023
Författare
Tommy Andersson,
Christer Andersson,
Fredrik Andersson