Denna webbplats lagrar cookies i begränsad omfattning. Genom att besöka sidan, godkänner du villkoren i vår integritetspolicy. Läs mer

Oxford Economic Papers

Privatization, Investment and Ownership Efficiency

Vetenskaplig artikel på engelska
Referens
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan och Lars Persson (2012). ”Privatization, Investment and Ownership Efficiency”. Oxford Economic Papers 64(4), 765–786. doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpr053

Författare
Pehr-Johan Norbäck, Lars Persson

We provide a model that explains the following empirical observations: (i) private ownership is more efficient than public ownership, (ii) privatizations are associated with increases in efficiency, and (iii) the increase in efficiency predates the privatization. The two key mechanisms explaining the results are: (i) a government owner keeping control can affect long-run employment levels when investing and (ii) a privatizing government has a stronger incentive to invest than an acquiring firm: the government exploits the fact that investments increase the sales price not only due to the increase in the acquirer’s profit, but also due to a reduced profit for the non-acquirer.

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

+46 (0)8 665 4522
+46 (0)73 574 3379
pehr-johan.norback@ifn.se