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Energy Journal

Nuclear Capacity Auctions

Vetenskaplig artikel på engelska
Referens
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof och Thomas Tangerås (2015). ”Nuclear Capacity Auctions”. Energy Journal 36(3), 247–261. doi.org/10.5547/01956574.36.3.sfri

Författare
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Thomas Tangerås

We propose nuclear capacity auctions as a means to correcting the incentives for investing in nuclear power. In particular, capacity auctions open the market for large-scale entry by outside firms. Requiring licensees to sell a share of capacity as virtual power plant contracts increases auction efficiency by mitigating incumbent producers’ incentive to bid for market power. A motivating example is Sweden’s policy reversal to allow new nuclear power to replace old reactors.

Thomas Tangerås

+46 (0)8 665 4526
+46 (0)70 727 5448
thomas.tangeras@ifn.se