Working Paper No. 545

Privatization and Foreign Competition

Publicerad: September 4, 2000Antal sidor: 38Nyckelord: Privatization; Failing Firms; FDI; Acquisitions; National TreatmentJEL-koder: F23; L13; L33

Privatization and Foreign Competition Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars Persson


This paper determines the equilibrium market structure in a mixed international oligopoly, where the state assets are sold at an auction. The model suggests that low greenfield costs and low trade costs induce foreign acquisitions. The intuition is that domestic firms can then not prevent foreign firms from becoming strong competitors and thus, their willingness to pay for the state assets is low. We also find that profit shifting from domestic to foreign firms generated by National Treatments clauses is partly paid for by the foreign investor in the bidding competition over the state assets.

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

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Lars Persson

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Tel: 08 665 4504
lars.persson@ifn.se

Kollektivavtal och lönebildning i en ny tid

Kollektivavtal-framsida.gif

 Kollektivavtal och lönebildning i en ny tid av Lars Calmfors, Simon Ek och Per Skedinger, IFN, samt Ann-Sofie Kolm, Stockholms universitet, analyseras olika sätt att göra lönebildningen mer flexibel. Analysen utmanar den etablerade synen inom partsorganisationerna på hur lönebildningen bör fungera. 

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