Working Paper No. 585

Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics

Publicerad: November 15, 2002Antal sidor: 14Nyckelord: Welfare State; Social Norms; Social InsuranceJEL-koder: D19; D64; H31; Z13

Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics Assar Lindbeck, Sten Nyberg and Jörgen W. Weibull


The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.

Assar Lindbeck

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Kollektivavtal och lönebildning i en ny tid

Kollektivavtal-framsida.gif

 Kollektivavtal och lönebildning i en ny tid av Lars Calmfors, Simon Ek och Per Skedinger, IFN, samt Ann-Sofie Kolm, Stockholms universitet, analyseras olika sätt att göra lönebildningen mer flexibel. Analysen utmanar den etablerade synen inom partsorganisationerna på hur lönebildningen bör fungera. 

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