Working Paper No. 613

Trapped, Delayed and Handicapped

Publicerad: March 16, 2004Antal sidor: 42Nyckelord: Self-Confidence; Self-Selection; Skill Accumulation; Bayesian Learning JEL-koder: D83; J24

Trapped, Delayed and Handicapped Anna Sjögren and Susanna Sällström


The dynamics of self-confidence are modelled in an environment where rational individuals optimally choose educations and occupations with the aim to acquire productive skills while learning about ability. It is shown how the presence of uninformative options can trap individuals below their potential. Furthermore, the trade-off between probability of success and value of skills may induce uncertain individuals to acquire less productive skills on their way to ability intensive occupations. The value of information also induces uncertain individuals to delay their labor market entry. The model can explain differences in perseverance in the face of failure.

 

Kollektivavtal och lönebildning i en ny tid

Kollektivavtal-framsida.gif

 Kollektivavtal och lönebildning i en ny tid av Lars Calmfors, Simon Ek och Per Skedinger, IFN, samt Ann-Sofie Kolm, Stockholms universitet, analyseras olika sätt att göra lönebildningen mer flexibel. Analysen utmanar den etablerade synen inom partsorganisationerna på hur lönebildningen bör fungera. 

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