Working Paper No. 633

Improving the SGP: Taxes and Delegation rather than Fines

Publicerad: December 14, 2004Antal sidor: 24Nyckelord: Stability and Growth Pact; Spillover Effects; Policy Failures; Pigouvian Taxes; Policy Delegation JEL-koder: E63; F33; F42; H60

Improving the SGP: Taxes and Delegation rather than Fines Assar Lindbeck and Dirk Niepelt


We analyze motivations for, and possible alternatives to, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). With regard to the former, we identify domestic policy failures and various cross-country spillover effects; with regard to the latter, we contrast an "economic-theory" perspective on optimal corrective measures with the "legalistic" perspective adopted in the SGP. We discuss the advantages of replacing the Pact's rigid rules backed by fines with corrective taxes (as far as spillover effects are concerned) and procedural rules and limited delegation of fiscal powers (as far as domestic policy failures are concerned). This would not only enhance the efficiency of the Pact, but also render it easier to enforce.

 

Assar Lindbeck

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Kollektivavtal och lönebildning i en ny tid

Kollektivavtal-framsida.gif

 Kollektivavtal och lönebildning i en ny tid av Lars Calmfors, Simon Ek och Per Skedinger, IFN, samt Ann-Sofie Kolm, Stockholms universitet, analyseras olika sätt att göra lönebildningen mer flexibel. Analysen utmanar den etablerade synen inom partsorganisationerna på hur lönebildningen bör fungera. 

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