

# Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	xi
<i>List of tables</i>	xiii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xv

## **Part I Introduction**

1	Statement of the issues	3
	<i>Introduction</i>	3
	<i>The history of foreign property rights</i>	7
	<i>Multinational enterprise–host country relations from the late 1960s</i>	12
	<i>The flow of direct investment</i>	15
	<i>Summary and outline of the book</i>	17
2	Theoretical background	23
	<i>Introduction</i>	23
	<i>The nature of direct investment</i>	24
	<i>The socio-economic impact on host countries</i>	26
	<i>The basic motivation of multinational enterprises and host countries</i>	29
	<i>Behavioural options of multinational enterprises and host countries</i>	33
	<i>Direct and indirect effects</i>	35
	<i>The theory of the obsolescing bargain</i>	39
	<i>The market for direct investment</i>	40
	<i>Summary</i>	44

## **Part II Taxation of multinational enterprise affiliates**

3	Taxation of multinational enterprise affiliates by competing host countries	49
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viii *Contents*

	<i>Introduction</i>	49
	<i>The game</i>	51
	<i>Model 1: Non-deferrable production</i>	54
	<i>Model 2: Production at any time</i>	59
	<i>Model 3: Investment incentives offered by two identical countries</i>	62
	<i>Model 4: Investment incentives offered by dissimilar countries</i>	65
	<i>Comparison of the model results</i>	70
	<i>Concluding remarks</i>	72
4	Foreign exchange versus pollution	75
	<i>Introduction</i>	75
	<i>Pollution intensive activities and direct investment</i>	76
	<i>Bargaining with environmental protection</i>	78
	<i>The pattern of direct investment</i>	81
	<i>Factors affecting the model results</i>	84
	<i>Summary and conclusions</i>	87
 <b>Part III Nationalization of multinational enterprise affiliates</b>		
5	Nationalization of multinational enterprise affiliates by competing host countries	91
	<i>Introduction</i>	91
	<i>Direct and indirect costs of nationalization</i>	93
	<i>Mixed strategy equilibrium</i>	99
	<i>Framework of two-country competition</i>	102
	<i>Two-country equilibrium</i>	106
	<i>Determinants of nationalization</i>	111
	<i>Summary and conclusions</i>	114
6	Cross-country variation in nationalization	117
	<i>Introduction</i>	117
	<i>The empirical record</i>	118
	<i>Theoretical framework</i>	123
	<i>Data</i>	126
	<i>Hypotheses and variables</i>	128
	<i>The probit model</i>	130
	<i>Results of the probit model</i>	131
	<i>Binomial model and estimation</i>	133
	<i>Results of the binomial model</i>	136
	<i>Conclusions</i>	144

7	Duration of nationalization	147
	<i>Introduction</i>	147
	<i>Previous explanations for the termination</i>	148
	<i>New hypotheses</i>	156
	<i>Data, duration model and estimation</i>	160
	<i>Results</i>	161
	<i>Concluding remarks</i>	164
<b>Part IV Conclusion and policy implications</b>		
8	Conclusions	169
	<i>Introduction</i>	169
	<i>Implications for empirical studies</i>	170
	<i>Policy implications</i>	172
	<i>Notes</i>	177
	<i>References</i>	184
	<i>Index</i>	192

## Figures

1.1	Foreign direct investment inflows by major regions, 1970–85, in billions of dollars	16
2.1	The goods–bads box of an investment project	31
3.1	Irreversible cost useful immediately only (in extensive form)	55
3.2	The distribution of gains (in coalitional form)	57
3.3	Irreversible cost useful in production at any time (in extensive form)	60
3.4	Initial incentives offered by two identical countries (in extensive form)	63
3.5	Initial incentives offered by two dissimilar countries (in extensive form)	66
3.6	Equilibrium distribution at different values of $B$	68
3.7	Equilibrium relation between $k$ and $B$	69
5.1	One-firm–one-country game (in extensive form)	94
5.2	One-firm–one-country game (in coalitional form)	95
5.3	Nationalization in trigger equilibria	98
5.4	Distribution of profits in two countries	104
5.5	Nationalization in country A	107
6.1	The cross-time distribution of nationalization across regions	119
6.2	The cross-time distribution of nationalization across sectors	120
6.3	The number of countries undertaking nationalization across regions	121
6.4	The number of years of nationalization: frequencies	134
6.5	The $D(\theta)$ functions ( $Q = 2, 3$ ) for the mixed binomial model	137
6.6	Logistic discrimination probabilities for the highest constant	139

*Figures* xii

6.7	Countrywise predicted reduction in nationalization frequency due to a 1 per cent increase in the rate of growth	142
6.8	Predicted effect of the rate of growth on nationalization frequency for (a) Peru and (b) Mexico	143
7.1	Duration of nationalization frequencies	158
7.2	Log-log plot to test for a Weibull distribution	163
7.3	Plot of expected uniform order statistic versus ordered truncated distribution function	164

## Tables

1.1	Inflows of foreign direct investment by regions of developing countries, 1970–80	18
3.1	Summary of equilibrium properties	71
5.1	Two-country pay-offs	106
5.2	Numerical example with two countries	107
5.3	Pay-off to nationalization in two countries, normal form	108
5.4	Unique equilibria in a two-country set-up	109
5.5	Conditions for two-country subgame perfect equilibria	111
6.1	Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics	129
6.2	Estimation results of the probit model	132
6.3	Estimation results of the binomial model	136
6.4	Countrywise predicted reduction in nationalization frequency due to a 1 per cent increase in the rate of growth and a reduction in export commodity concentration by a factor of 0.9	141
6.5	Hypotheses and results of the probit and binomial models	144
7.1	Net income of manufacturing: US direct investment in developing countries, 1977 and 1982	151
7.2	Foreign income taxes in manufacturing: US direct investment in developing countries, 1977 and 1982	152
7.3	Investment incentives and performance requirements: US direct investment in developing countries, 1977 and 1982	153
7.4	Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics	159
7.5	Weibull model results	162