Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect anti-competitive mergers.
Working Paper No. 542
Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers
Working Paper
Reference
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof and Johan Stennek (2000). “Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers”. IFN Working Paper No. 542. Stockholm: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof and Johan Stennek (2000). “Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers”. IFN Working Paper No. 542. Stockholm: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Authors
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Johan Stennek
