Private firms may not have efficient incentives to allow third-party producers to access their platform or develop extensions for their products. Based on a two-sided market model, I discuss two reasons for why. First, a private firm may not be able to internalize all benefits from cross-group externalities arising with third-party extensions. Second, firms may have strategic incentives to shut out third-parties because it relaxes competition.
Working Paper No. 748
Efficiency and the Provision of Open Platforms
Working Paper
Reference
Tåg, Joacim (2008). “Efficiency and the Provision of Open Platforms”. IFN Working Paper No. 748. Stockholm: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Tåg, Joacim (2008). “Efficiency and the Provision of Open Platforms”. IFN Working Paper No. 748. Stockholm: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Author
Joacim Tåg