This Website uses cookies. By using this website you are agreeing to our use of cookies and to the terms and conditions listed in our data protection policy. Read more

American Economic Review

National Treatment in the GATT

Journal Article
Reference
Horn, Henrik (2006). “National Treatment in the GATT”. American Economic Review 96(1), 394–404. doi.org/10.1257/000282806776157768

Author
Henrik Horn

The National Treatment (NT) clause is the first-line defense in the GATT (and in most other trade agreements) against opportunistic exploitation of the inevitable incompleteness of the agreement. This paper examines the role of NT as it applies to internal taxation under the GATT. It is shown that despite severely restricting the freedom to set internal taxes, NT may improve government welfare, but it will not completely solve the incomplete contract problem it is meant to remedy. Furthermore, it requires a high degree of economic sophistication on behalf of trade negotiators in order for this beneficial effect to materialize.

Henrik Horn

+46 (0)8 665 45 40
henrik.horn@ifn.se