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Henrik Horn

Professor

Henrik Horn is Professor of International Economics. His work focuses on issues at the intersection of Economics and Law, in particular with regard to trade agreements and investment treaties. He also works on competition and regulation problems.

Henrik Horn is Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank, Research Fellow in the International Trade and Industrial Organization Programmes of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, and Senior Programme Associate, Global Economics Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

Henrik Horn was earlier at the Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, worked for four years at the WTO in Geneva, and he has served as a judge in Marknadsdomstolen (the Swedish supreme court for e.g. competition law). He has taught from introductory level to advanced graduate level at e.g Stockholm University, Stockholm School of Economics, the University of Michigan, Princeton University, the World Trade Institute (Bern), and the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva). 

IFN Researcher
Contact

Henrik Horn

+46 (0)8 665 45 40
Research interests: Competition policy, Digitalization, Electricity markets, Industrial economics, Industrial organization, International trade, Market regulations, Trade policy

Current projects:

International investment treaties

International investment agreements protect foreign investors against host country policy measures. The agreements have been severely criticised both in the policy debate, and by academic economists, lawyers and political scientists. Particularly contentious is that they allow private investors to pursue disputes against host countries (Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ISDS). It is argued that the agreements' stipulated compensation requirements dissuade countries from pursuing legitimate policies. These agreements have largely been ignored in Economics research. But there is a nascent literature. The purpose of this project is to contribute to these developments. 

"Economics of International Investment Agreements" (with Thomas Tangerås). Final version published in Journal of International Economics, 2021.

"Dispute Settlement in International Investment Agreements" (with Thomas Tangerås), 2021. IFN Working Paper No. 1248, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 14480.

Economic Aspects of International Investment Agreements”, American Review of International Arbitration 30(1), 11–34, 2019.

“International Investment Agreements: Efficient Means of Promoting Swedish Growth?”, report commissioned by the Swedish Agency for Growth Policy Analysis, 2019.

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Standard-essential patents and the principles for international allocation of jurisdiction in International Law

A sizeable literature analyzes the appropriate interpretation of FRAND commitments for standard- essential patents. With few exceptions, the literature disregards international dimensions, despite the fact that most standards are used in international markets. This  project uses a simple economic setting to assess pros and cons of the main jurisdictional bases in International Law: the Territoriality and Nationality Principles when national regulatory authorities have conflicting views regarding the appropriate interpretation of FRAND commitments. The paper identifies situations where the bases can implement efficient outcomes, and where they fail. The paper also shows how non-discrimination obligations might improve upon the outcomes.

International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents”. IFN Working Paper No. 1314, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 14297, and Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Paper No. 2020/02

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Integration of electricity markets with national transmission systems operators 

In this project we develop a framework for analyzing the incentives of national transmission system oper- ators (TSOs) to supply cross-border interconnection capacity in an international electricity market. Our results show that equilibrium transmission capacity is downward distorted, even in situations where full capacity utilization is ine¢ cient. We derive a method for quantifying these distortions and propose a market design that uniquely implements e¢ cient dispatch of electricity. In this design, the distribution of trade adjustment payments causes TSOs to internalize the full e§ect of network congestion. The design would improve, for instance, on the current European market design.

National Transmission Network Operators in an Integrated Electricity Market” (with Thomas Tangerås). IFN Working Paper No. 1394, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 16 289.

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The WTO Dispute Settlement data set

Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (Columbia Law School) have assembled a data set on the use of the WTO Dispute Settlement system. The first version appeared in 2006 with support from the World Bank. The latest published version, updated i collaboration with the Global Governance Program at European University Institute, includes all 507 disputes that have been initiated since the launch of the WTO:s 1 January 1995 until May 2016. The data set includes around 50 000 data points. Each dispute is followed from its initiation through a Request for Consultation, via panel and Appellate Body proceedings to its end. It is currently being updated in a joint effort with economists and political scientists at the University of California San Diego.

The 2016 version of the data set

The 2016 manual

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Earlier projects:

Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, American Law Institute

The purpose of this project was to create a forum for regular analysis of the WTO and its Dispute Dettlement Mechanism. The project was conducted under the auspices of the American Law Institute (ALI) from 2002, with Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (Columbia Law School) as Co-Chief Reporters. The ALI is the leading independent US institution for legal analys, with approx. 4 000 elected members.

One purpose of the project was to let leading economists and lawyers jointly evaluate the emerging case law from the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The project still continues. To date, more than 100 reports have been written, covering alla disputes 2001-2019. The reports can be downloaded here

A second purpose was to evaluate central components of the GATT, the part of the WTO covering goods trade. The following reports was written as part of this effort: Economic and Legal Principles of World Trade Law: National Treatment (Gene M. Grossman, Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis)