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Journal of International Economics

Economics of International Investment Agreements

Scientific Article in English
Reference
Horn, Henrik and Thomas Tangerås (2021). “Economics of International Investment Agreements”. Journal of International Economics 131, 103433. doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2021.103433

Authors
Henrik Horn, Thomas Tangerås

Nearly 2700 highly potent international investment agreements protect foreign investment against host country policies. This paper analyzes the design and implications of their contentious provisions regarding regulatory expropriations. It derives conditions under which “carve-out” compensation mechanisms, similar to those in actual agreements, solve underinvestment and overregulation problems and simultaneously distribute surplus according to countries' bargaining power. The paper examines a number of additional policy relevant issues, for instance, how to modify agreements when carve-out compensation is inefficient, whether agreements cause “regulatory chill,” and the different motives and distributional consequences of North-South versus North-North agreements.

Henrik Horn

+46 (0)8 665 45 40
henrik.horn@ifn.se

Thomas Tangerås

+46 (0)8 665 4526
+46 (0)70 727 5448
thomas.tangeras@ifn.se